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 It has been reported that persons suffering from depression tend to have difficulty 
retrieving autobiographical memories of events that occurred on a single day in their lives 
(e.g., “Last Tuesday night in the Student Union”), and tend instead to retrieve memories 
that encompass a category of events over extended time periods (e.g., “I used to go to the 
Student Union a lot.”).  However, the instrument with which this phenomenon is 
generally measured – the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT) – appears to confound 
the effects of at least two separate underlying processes:  (1) the inability or 
unwillingness of depressed persons to remember and comply with the AMT’s instruction 
to retrieve only single-day memories (instruction neglect), and (2) the tendency of 
depressed persons to have a preponderance of (or easier access to) autobiographical 
memories that conflate extended time periods and/or categories of events, and to have 
fewer (or more difficult access to) autobiographical memories of single-day events 
(autobiographical overgenerality).  There are reasons to suppose that both of these 
processes may be associated with depression and that they both contribute to, and are 
confounded in, scores on the AMT.  This dissertation project employed two different 
versions of the AMT in an attempt to dissociate these two processes. However, the scores 
on neither of these tests correlated with measures of depression, depressive rumination, or 
executive dysfunction.  Given the power of this study, these null results are partially 




of the AMT are driven largely by instruction neglect, but the design of this study 
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Origin of the AMT 
 In 1986, while pilot testing a study of mood-congruent recall among recent 
suicide attempters, Williams and Broadbent made a serendipitous observation that 
recently suicidal respondents had difficulty retrieving memories of events that occurred 
on a single day in their lives:  When instructed to retrieve such temporally specific 
memories, they often violated the instruction and instead retrieved memories 
encompassing time periods longer than a single day (e.g., “when I was at school”) or 
memories that refer not to single-day events, but to geographical locations (e.g., "that 
hotel in Germany"; Williams & Broadbent, 1986).  To further study this phenomenon, 
Williams and Broadbent developed the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT) in which 
respondents are presented with a series of cue word stimuli (e.g., happy, angry) and 
instructed that following each cue word they should retrieve a specific autobiographical 
memory of which the cue word reminds them.  Participants are further instructed that a 
“specific” autobiographical memory is a memory of a personally experienced event that 
occurred on a single day in their lives.   
 Williams and Broadbent administered the AMT to a group of 25 participants who 





participants who were hospitalized for medical concerns, and a second control group of 
25 nonsuicidal and nonhospitalized participants.  The authors then coded each of the 
memories retrieved by their participants as either specific (i.e., in compliance with the 
specificity instruction) or overgeneral (i.e., contrary to the specificity instruction).  For 
example, in response to the cue word happy, an autobiographical memory such as “at 
home last Tuesday evening” was coded as specific, while a memory such as “when I am 
at home” was coded as overgeneral (Williams & Scott, 1988).  Williams and Broadbent 
report that 44% of the memories retrieved by the recently suicidal participants were 
overgeneral, while only 20% of the memories retrieved by the hospitalized control 
participants and 19% of the memories retrieved by the nonhospitalized control 
participants were overgeneral.  Thus, the recently suicidal participants were significantly 
more likely than the participants in either control group to violate the specificity 
instruction and to retrieve overgeneral memories in response to the AMT’s cue words 
(Williams & Broadbent, 1986).   
  
Associations between AMT scores and depression 
 
 Williams and Broadbent’s 1986 report has generated a significant amount of 
research activity.  In 2006, the journal Cognition and Emotion published a Special Issue 
on the associations between psychopathology and the tendency to retrieve overgeneral 
memories in response to the AMT.  In the introduction to that Special Issue, Hermans, 
Raes, Philippot, and Kremers (2006) noted that in the preceding 20 years there had been 
over 150 publications on this topic.  The Special Issue itself contained an additional 12 
such articles.  A computerized literature search conducted on January 22, 2011, in which 





field of the PsycINFO article database, yielded an additional 66 publications in the years 
2007 through 2010. 
 This body of published research that has accumulated in the 24 years since the 
publication of Williams and Broadbent’s 1986 report can be roughly divided into three 
categories: 
• Cross-sectional studies of the association between depression and a pattern of 
overgeneral responses to the AMT; 
• Studies of the persistence of a pattern of overgeneral responses to the AMT after 
the remission of depression; and 
• Studies of a pattern of overgeneral responses to the AMT as a predictor of the 
onset and course of depression. 
Studies exemplifying each of these categories are summarized below. 
 
Cross-sectional studies  
 
 Williams and Broadbent’s (1986) finding that recently suicidal participants 
retrieve fewer specific autobiographical memories in response to the AMT than do 
nonsuicidal control participants has been replicated in studies by Kaviani, Rahimi-
Darabad, and Naghavi (2005), Leibetseder, Rohrer, Mackinger, and Fartacek (2006), 
Pollock and Williams (1998), and Williams, Ellis, Tyers and Healy (1996).  However, the 
majority of research in this area has addressed whether this effect generalizes beyond 
recent suicidality.  It has been reported that overgenerality of AMT responses is reliably 
associated with clinical depression (van Vreeswijk & de Wilde, 2004; Williams et al., 
2007).  The association between nonclinical depression and overgeneral AMT responses 





Burton, 1997; Raes, Hermans, Williams, & Eelen, 2007; Ramponi, Barnard, & Nimmo-
Smith, 2004; Rekart, Mineka, & Zinbarg, 2006), while others have not (e.g., Raes, 
Pousset, & Hermans, 2004).1 
 
Persistence studies  
 
 If the published findings regarding associations with overgeneral AMT responses 
were limited to the sorts of cross-sectional, correlational studies discussed in the 
preceding section, then these associations might be interpreted not as reflecting a 
phenomenon separate from depression, but simply as manifesting a previously undetected 
symptom of depression.  However, the overgenerality of autobiographical memories 
retrieved in response to the AMT not only correlates with current state depression, but 
has also been reported to persist as a relatively stable trait after the remittance of 
depressive symptomatology (Mackinger, Pachinger, Leibetseder, & Fartacek, 2000; 
Spinhoven et al., 2006; J. Mark Williams & Dritschel, 1988).  This persistence of the 
overgenerality of AMT responses supports an inference that it is a phenomenon separate 




 If the body of research regarding the associations of overgeneral AMT responses  
were limited to the cross-sectional, correlational studies and/or the longitudinal, 
persistence studies discussed in the preceding two sections, there would be no way to 
                                            
1Depression is not the only form of psychopathology that has been reported to correlate with over-
generality of AMT responses.  For example, over-general AMT responses have been reported to correlate 
with a history of childhood abuse (Hermans et al., 2004), acute stress disorder (Harvey, Bryant, & Dang, 
1998), and post-traumatic stress disorder (McNally, Lasko, Macklin, & Pitman, 1995).  For the remainder 






resolve the question of causation:  The findings of these studies are equally consistent 
with hypotheses that the AMT measures a cause of depression (e.g., that the tendency to 
respond to the AMT with overgeneral memories reflects some sort of vulnerability to 
depression), or that the AMT measures a consequence of depression (e.g., that the 
overgenerality of AMT responses is a persisting cognitive “scar” from past depression).  
However, additional longitudinal studies have addressed this question of causation, 
reporting that the tendency to give overgeneral autobiographical memories in response to 
the AMT precedes and predicts the onset and course of depression.  Sumner, Griffith, and 
Mineka (2010) performed a meta-analysis of 15 of these studies and concluded that the 
overgenerality of responses to the AMT has a small but reliable predictive effect on the 
course of depression.  Because of the importance of this question of causation in the 
present research project, several of the longitudinal studies that have reported this 
predictive effect are summarized below. 
 Raes et al. (2008) report that the tendency to retrieve overgeneral 
autobiographical memories in response to the AMT predicts a poor response to 
electroconvulsive therapy (ECT).  Raes et al. administered the AMT and the Hamilton 
Rating Scale for Depression (HRSD) to 25 participants who had been diagnosed with 
major depressive disorder and who were about to undergo ECT.  The HRSD was again 
administered immediately after the conclusion of each participant’s course of ECT and 
again 1 week thereafter.  The participants’ pre-ECT AMT scores were not correlated with 
their HRSD scores immediately following ECT, but were correlated with the change in 





correlation remained significant even after controlling for pre-ECT HRSD scores and 
post-ECT HRSD scores (Raes et al., 2008). 
 Kleim and Ehlers (2008) report that the tendency to retrieve overgeneral 
autobiographical memories in response to the AMT predicts the development of both 
PTSD and major depression following a physical assault.  Kleim and Ehlers administered 
the AMT to 190 research participants 2 weeks after each had survived a physical assault.  
At the same time, the Acute Stress Disorder Scale was administered to assess symptoms 
of Acute Distress Disorder (ASD), and the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV 
(SCID) was administered to assess symptoms of depression.   Six months following the 
research participants’ assaults, the SCID was again administered to assess for the 
presence of major depression and the PTSD Symptom Scale-Interview Version was 
administered to assess for the presence of PTSD.  Although 43% of the variance in the 
incidence of PTSD at 6 months was explained by ASD symptom severity 2 weeks 
following the participants’ assaults, an additional 4% of the variance was explained by 
AMT scores.  And although 13% of the variance in the incidence of major depression at 6 
months was explained by depressive symptom severity 2 weeks following the 
participants’ assaults, an additional 6% of the variance was explained by AMT scores 
(Kleim & Ehlers, 2008).   
 Hermans et al. (2008) report that the overgenerality of AMT responses predicts 
the course of Major Depressive Disorder.  Hermans et al. administered the AMT and the 
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II) to 26 research participants who had recently been 
admitted for in-patient treatment for Major Depressive Disorder.  Three to four weeks 





depressive symptomatology again assessed with the BDI-II.  AMT scores were not 
correlated with BDI-II scores at admission, and did not predict BDI-II scores at follow-
up.2  However, AMT scores did predict which of the participants still met the diagnostic 
criteria for Major Depressive Disorder at follow-up (Hermans et al., 2008). 
 Gibbs and Rude (2004) report that the overgenerality of AMT responses interacts 
with life stress to predict subsequent depressive symptomatology.  Gibbs and Rude 
administered the AMT and the BDI-II to 89 college students.  Four to six weeks later, the 
BDI-II was again administered and the incidence of various types of life stressors in the 
period between baseline and follow-up was assessed with the Negative Life Events 
Questionnaire (NLEQ).  Baseline BDI-II scores entered in the first step of a hierarchical 
multiple regression analysis accounted for 40% of the variance in follow-up BDI-II 
scores.  The first-order effects of AMT scores and reported incidence of life stressors 
accounted for an additional 3% of the variance in follow-up BDI-II scores.  But in 
addition, the interaction between AMT scores and life stressors accounted for another 4% 
of the variance in follow-up BDI-II scores (Gibbs & Rude, 2004). 
 It has also been reported that the tendency to retrieve overgeneral 
autobiographical memories in response to the AMT predicts the following:   
• Remission of cognitive dimensions of DBI-II scores following initiation of 
continuous positive airway pressure therapy in persons who suffer from 
obstructive sleep apnea and who also have a history of major depression 
(Mackinger & Svaldi, 2004);   
                                            
2
 A number of other articles have reported that the specificity of AMT specificity does predict the remission 
of depressive symptomatology (Brittlebank, Scott, Williams, & Ferrier, 1993; Peeters, Wessel, 





• Improvement in depressive symptomatology as measured by the Montgomery-
Asberg Depression Rating Scale in male alcoholics following detoxification 
therapy (Mackinger et al., 2004); 
• Course of Seasonal Affective Disorder (Dalgleish, Spinks, Yiend, & Kuyken, 
2001); 
• Vulnerability to postpartum depression (Hipwell, Reynolds, & Crick, 2004; 
Mackinger, Loschin, & Leibetseder, 2000); and  
• Vulnerability to depression and anxiety following unsuccessful in vitro 
fertilization (van Minnen, Wessel, Verhaak, & Smeenk, 2005). 
These reports that the overgenerality of AMT responses precedes and predicts the onset 
and/or course of depression support an inference that this phenomenon is somehow 
involved in the vulnerability to and maintenance of depression.  However, 
notwithstanding 24 years of correlational and longitudinal research, it remains unclear 
what AMT scores actually signify, i.e., it is not clear what processes predispose 
respondents who are currently depressed, have previously been depressed, or are 
vulnerable to depression to retrieve overgeneral autobiographical memories in response 
to the AMT.    
 
What does the AMT measure? 
 
Throughout the AMT literature surveyed above, there is an almost universal 
presupposition that what the test measures is a characteristic of a respondent’s 
autobiographical memory: the extent to which a respondent has a preponderance of (or 
easier access to) autobiographical memories that conflate extended time periods and/or 





memories of single-day events.  That is, a respondent’s public behavior of reporting 
overgeneral autobiographical memories in response to the AMT is presupposed to reflect 
an overgeneral bias in his or her intrapsychic autobiographical memory processes.3 
An example of this presupposition is the statement by Hermans et al. (2006) that 
the AMT literature demonstrates that “the inability to retrieve specific memories forms a 
chief characteristic of those who suffer from major depression” (p. 322).  Likewise, 
Williams et al. (2007) state that the AMT measures a depressed person’s  tendency to 
“retrieve overgeneral memories when attempting to retrieve memories of specific events. 
. . . The phenomenon of overgeneral memory ranks alongside other memory deficits 
known for many years to be associated with depression” (p. 143).  And Debeer, Hermans 
and Raes (2009) state that, “Research over the past 20 years has led to well-established 
evidence that depressed people show an overgeneral autobiographical memory bias” (p. 
892).  Throughout this dissertation report, the term “autobiographical overgenerality” will 
be used to refer to such an overgeneral bias in a person’s intrapsychic autobiographical 
remembering. Within the existing AMT literature, any possibility that AMT scores might 
in whole or in part reflect something other than autobiographical overgenerality is rarely 
discussed or even acknowledged.4 
 However, in the majority of studies in this area, the AMT is the only measure 
used to assess autobiographical overgenerality (Sumner et al., 2010).  Such reliance on a 
                                            
3
 This distinction between the public behavior of responding to a test and an intrapsychic state or trait is 
common to many psychological tests.  Thus, responding to the BDI-II in such a way that one’s total score is 
relatively elevated is a public behavior.  This behavior is not equivalent to the intrapsychic phenomenon of 
state or trait depression.  The extent to which the public behavior reflects the intrapsychic state or trait is 
the focus of validation studies. 
4
 As will be discussed below, Dalgleish et al. (2007) report findings that suggest that the AMT measures 
impairment of executive functioning.  Although these findings implicitly challenge the presupposition that 
the AMT measures only autobiographical over-generality, Dalgleish et al. continue to phrase their findings 





single instrument to measure a construct such as autobiographical overgenerality poses a 
risk of a validity error known as monomethod bias (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002).  
Although Williams and Broadbent (1986) developed the AMT with the intent that it 
measure autobiographical overgenerality, the scores on any single such instrument are 
inevitably an amalgam, reflecting not only the construct that is intended to be measured, 
but also the method by which the particular instrument takes the measurement (Campbell 
& Fiske, 1959).  Because any single instrument confounds content and method, the valid 
measure of any construct requires more than one instrument (Campbell & Fiske, 1959).  
The threat to validity that results from the reliance on a single instrument is called 
monomethod bias (Shadish et al., 2002). 
 The format of the AMT creates one immediately apparent risk of monomethod 
bias. As stated above, the AMT instructs participants to retrieve a single-day 
autobiographical memory in response to each of a series of stimulus words.  A 
participant’s AMT score is his or her tendency to violate that specificity instruction, i.e., 
the proportion of the participant’s responses that are not single-day autobiographical 
memories.  Because of this format, there are two different intrapsychic processes by 
which a participant could achieve an AMT score reflecting a pattern of overgeneral 
responding:  First, a participant may violate the specificity instruction for exactly the 
reason that is presupposed in the AMT literature -- autobiographical overgenerality.  That 
is, a participant may give overgeneral autobiographical memories in response to the AMT 
(a public behavior) because she tends to remember her life in overgeneral terms and has a 
deficit of single-day memories, or at least difficulty accessing single-day memories (an 





a participant would have difficulty complying with the instruction to retrieve only single-
day memories, and would instead tend to respond with overgeneral memories.  If this 
were the only process that could result in a pattern of overgeneral responses to the AMT, 
then the prevailing certitude about what the test measures would be justified.   
 There is, however, a second intrapsychic process that could result in the same 
public act of responding to the AMT with overgeneral memories.  A participant could 
violate the AMT’s specificity instruction if, while responding to the AMT, he has 
difficulty retaining the instruction in working memory as a result of limited executive 
capacity, or if he simply is unmotivated to comply with the instruction.  Such a 
participant might report whatever autobiographical memories come first to mind, be they 
specific or overgeneral. Such haphazard responses would, on average, be more 
overgeneral than the responses of a participant who was able and motivated to diligently 
comply with the AMT’s specificity instruction.  This public behavior of giving relatively 
more overgeneral responses to the AMT would not, however, reflect any overgeneral bias 
in the respondent’s intrapsychic memory, i.e., it would not measure autobiographical 
overgenerality.  Rather, this overgenerality would reflect a very different intrapsychic 
process: the limitation of the respondent’s capacity or motivation to comply with the 
AMT’s specificity instruction.   Throughout this dissertation report, the term “instruction 
neglect” will be used to refer to such inability to retain the AMT’s specificity instruction 
in working memory or unwillingness to comply with the instruction.   
 Up to this point in the discussion, these two intrapsychic processes – (1) 
instruction neglect and (2) autobiographical overgenerality – have been presented as 





specificity instruction and to respond to the test with memories that are on average more 
overgeneral than the responses of nondepressed persons.  As discussed in the next two 
subsections, there are suggestions in the literature that both of these processes do in fact 
underlie and mediate the often-reported association between depression and the 
overgenerally of AMT responses, and that these two processes are therefore confounded 




 As the construct of instruction neglect was defined above, it could reflect either 
lack of capacity or lack of motivation.  Little research has been found regarding the 
second of these two etiologies – lack of motivation.  It has been noted that persons 
suffering from depression tend to have impaired motivation to engage in cognitively 
demanding tasks, and that this motivational deficit may contribute to the impaired 
cognitive functioning that has been observed in depression (Burt, Zembar, & Niederehe, 
1995; Hartlage, Alloy, Vázquez, & Dykman, 1993; Hertel & Rude, 1991).  It is plausible 
that motivation deficits may contribute to the association between depression and a 
tendency to violate the AMT’s specificity instruction, i.e., lacking the motivation to 
engage in the cognitive task of searching for single-day memories, depressed participants 
may simply report the first memory that comes to mind, whether or not it satisfies the 
specificity instruction.  However, no studies have been found testing the impact of 
motivational status on AMT performance.  The absence of studies on this point may 
reflect the practical difficulties of dissociating the impairment of motivation from the 





 There are, however, several studies investigating the association between 
impairment of executive capacity and the tendency to make overgeneral AMT responses.  
In the principal investigator’s master’s thesis research, 52 participants were tested with a 
computerized version of the AMT together with a measure of executive functioning – a 
Visual Search Task that had been developed by Hammar, Lund, and Hugdahl (2003b).  
This Visual Search Task was also utilized in the present study, and will be described in 
detail below.  Briefly stated, the Visual Search Task measures the extent to which visual 
scanning is slowed by visual distracters.  Although participants with relatively intact 
executive control are able to maintain visual attention notwithstanding visual distraction, 
participants with impaired executive control are less able to do so and the introduction of 
visual distracters therefore results in a greater slowing of visual scanning speed.  In the 
principal investigator’s thesis research project AMT scores were found to correlate with 
Visual Search Task scores at r = 0.37, that is, participants whose visual attention was 
relatively susceptible to distraction  also tended to be overgeneral in their AMT responses 
(McCowin, 2007). 
 Likewise, Ros, Latorre, and Serrano (2010) tested 96 participants with the AMT 
and various measures of “working memory executive processes.”  Specifically, the 
authors administered a measure of working memory with sustained attention in which 
participants were required to detect color sequences.  Participants viewed a computer 
screen on which a series of colored asterisks were displayed one by one; participants 
were instructed to press the “1” key as quickly as possible when they saw one of the 
following three color sequences: red-black-blue, red-yellow-green, or pink-brown-purple.  





positively with the number of correct responses to the working memory with sustained 
attention task (r = 0.25), and correlated negatively with the latency of correct responses (r 
= -0.23), the number of incorrect responses (r = -0.25), and the latency of incorrect 
responses (r = -0.22).  That is, participants who tended to be specific in their AMT 
responses also tended to correctly identify more of the target color sequences, to make 
fewer false-positive identification errors, and to respond more rapidly regardless of 
whether their responses were correct or false-positive.   
 Ros et al. (2010) also administered a reading span task which measured a 
participant’s capacity to hold a series of letters in working memory while simultaneously 
judging the semantic correctness of a series of sentences.  Participants viewed a computer 
screen on which a simple sentence was displayed; participants were instructed to read the 
sentence aloud and then indicate whether or not the sentence was semantically correct.  A 
letter was then briefly displayed on the screen.  Another simple sentence was displayed, 
then another letter, and so forth.  Participants were shown sets of from two to five 
sentence/letter pairs.  After each such set, participants were asked to recall the letters in 
the same order in which they had been presented.  The authors reported that the number 
of specific responses to the AMT correlated positively with the number of correctly 
recalled letters (r = 0.31), and correlated negatively with the number of errors in judging 
the semantic correctness of sentences (r = -0.31).  That is, participants who tended to be 
specific in their AMT responses also tended to correctly remember more of the letter 
sequences notwithstanding the concurrent cognitive load of judging the sentences’ 






 The association between executive impairment and overgenerality of AMT 
responses was further explored in a study by Heeren, Van Broeck, and Philippot (2009) 
testing whether mindfulness therapy has the effect of reducing the overgenerality of 
responses to the AMT, and whether this effect is mediated by an improvement in 
executive functioning.  The authors recruited 36 participants, 18 of whom underwent 8 
weeks of mindfulness training; the remaining 18 participants served as a control group.  
All 36 participants were tested with the AMT twice – a pretest before the 8-week 
mindfulness training, and a posttest at the end of the training.  A mixed-design ANOVA 
for the number of categorical5 responses to the AMT revealed a main effect of time (η2 = 
0.47) qualified by an interaction with group (η2 = 0.19).  The data are summarized in 
Table 1. That is, on the pretest the average AMT scores of the treatment group did not 
differ from the scores of the control group, and the AMT scores of the control group did 
not change from pretest to posttest.  However, the AMT scores of the treatment group 
changed significantly from pretest to posttest, indicating that the mindfulness training had 
the effect of reducing their categorical responses to the AMT.  As measures of cognitive 
  
 Table 1.  Data reported by Heeren, Van Broeck, and Philippot (2009) showing  
 effect of mindfulness training on AMT scores. 
 
Categorical AMT Responses:  Mean (standard deviation) 
 Pretest Posttest 
Mindfulness training group 2.33 (1.88) 0.22 (.54) 
Control group 2.28 (1.88) 1.61 (0.98) 
 
                                            
5
 Heeren, Van Broeck, and Philippot (2009) not only classified AMT responses as specific or over-general, 
but also subdivided the over-general AMT responses into “categoric” and “extended” classifications.  
Categorical memories refer to a category of repeated past events, while extended memories refer to past 
events that lasted longer than a single day.  As discussed below, although mindfulness training reduced 
both categorical and extended AMT responses in the treatment group, improvement in cognitive 
functioning was found to mediate only the effect on categorical memories.  Therefore, only the findings 





flexibility, the authors tested all 36 participants (both before and after the mindfulness 
training) with three measures of verbal flexibility – a semantic word fluency task, a 
phonemic word fluency task, and a verbs word fluency task.  A mixed-design ANOVA 
for the semantic word fluency task showed a main effect of time (η2=0.62), qualified by 
an interaction with group (η2= 0.56).  A mixed-design ANOVA for phonemic word 
fluency showed a main effect of time (η2= 0.29), again qualified by an interaction with 
group (η2=0.46).  For the verbs word fluency task, a mixed-design ANOVA showed a 
main effect of time (η2= 0.31), qualified by an interaction with Group (η2=0.34).  The 
data are summarized in Table 2. That is, on the pretest none of the verbal fluency scores 
of the treatment group differed from the scores of the control group, and the verbal 
fluency scores of the control group did not change from pretest to posttest.  However, all 
three of the verbal fluency scores of the treatment group changed significantly from 
pretest to posttest, indicating that the mindfulness training had the effect of enhancing 
this facet of executive functioning.  The authors then tested whether the sum of the three  
 
Table 2. Data reported by Heeren, Van Broeck, and Philippot (2009) showing 
effect of mindfulness training on verbal fluency scores. 
 
Verbal Fluency: Mean (standard deviation) 
 Pretest Posttest 
Mindfulness training 
group 
Semantic   35.78 (9.54) 49.56 (12.56) 
Phonemic 25.39 (9.05) 34.56 (7.04) 
Verb 40.56 (12.48) 51.33 (12.01) 
Control group Semantic 32.56 (5.36) 33.39 (5.10) 
Phonemic 25.06 (4.62) 23.33 (4.02) 






verbal fluency scores mediated the effect of mindfulness training upon AMT scores.    
The results of the mediation analysis are summarized in Figure 1.  That is, mindfulness  
training had a significant effect both on participants’ tendency to retrieve categorical 
memories in response to the AMT (Path C in Figure 1), and on the total of participants’ 
three verbal fluency scores (Path A in Figure 1).  In addition, the total verbal fluency 
scores had a significant effect on the tendency to give categorical AMT responses (Path B 
in Figure 1).  When the total verbal fluency scores are controlled for, the effect of 
mindfulness upon the tendency to give categorical memories is significantly reduced (the 
change in the uncorrected β weight above Path C to the corrected β weight below Path C 
in Figure 1).  The authors report that the Sobel test (1982) indicated that the mediation 
was statistically significant. 
 The three studies discussed above (Heeren et al., 2009; McCowin, 2007; Ros et 
al., 2010) support an inference that impairment of executive capacities might result in a 
pattern of overgeneral responding to the AMT, and that a treatment that has been shown 
to increase the specificity of AMT responses does so through the mediating  mechanism 







Figure 1.  Mediation diagram reported by Heeren, Van Broeck, and Philippot 
(2009).   Coefficients appearing above the path lines are uncorrected β weights.  
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whether impairment of executive functioning might underlie and mediate the association 
between depression and the overgenerality of AMT responses.  Dalgleish et al. (2007) 
report a series of eight studies that was designed to explore that issue. 
 In the first four of their eight studies, Dalgleish et al. (2007) found that 
overgenerality of AMT responses correlated positively with various measures of 
executive impairment, particularly when those measures reflected the participants’ errors 
– their failure to comply with the tests’ instructions.  That is, when respondents’ 
executive capacity was impaired, and particularly when that impairment resulted in their 
failure to comply with task instructions, the respondents also tended to violate the AMT’s 
specificity instruction and report overgeneral autobiographical memories.  In their sixth 
and seventh studies, in order to test the hypothesis that impairment of executive control 
partially mediates the correlation between depression and the tendency to retrieve 
overgeneral memories in response to the AMT, Dalgleish et al. manipulated the 
parameters of the AMT to vary the extent of the demand that the test places upon 
executive capacities.  The authors predicted that depression and the demand on executive 
control would interact in their effect on AMT scores.  That is, if the AMT parameters are 
manipulated so as to increase the demands on executive control, then the difference in 
AMT scores between depressed and nondepressed respondents should be increased.  
Alternatively, when the AMT parameters are manipulated so as to minimize the demands 
on executive control, then the difference in AMT scores between depressed and 
nondepressed respondents should be reduced.   
 In their sixth study, Dalgleish et al. manipulated the AMT’s cue words.  For half 





kiss, accident, evening); the authors refer to cue words in this category as “short-
duration” cue words.  For the other half of the cue, the authors selected words that 
routinely refer to more extended periods of time (e.g., summer, cancer, adolescence); the 
authors refer to cue words in this category as “long-duration” cue words.  Dalgleish et al. 
hypothesized that the long-duration cue words would tend to automatically evoke 
overgeneral autobiographical memories, and that inhibiting such automatically evoked 
overgeneral memories in order to persevere in the task of retrieving only specific 
autobiographical memories would place a demand on respondents’ executive capacities.  
By contrast, it was hypothesized that the short-duration cue words would tend to 
automatically evoke specific memories, thereby facilitating respondents’ compliance with 
the AMT’s specificity instruction with minimal demands on executive control.  Dalgleish 
administered this version of the AMT, together with the BDI, to a group of 18 
participants and reported that although BDI scores were negatively correlated with the 
specificity of the respondents’ responses to long-duration cue words (r = -0.50), there 
was almost no correlation between BDI scores and the specificity of responses to short-
duration cue words (r = -0.06).  Moreover, the authors calculated difference scores by 
subtracting the number of specific memories each participant retrieved in response to the 
long-duration cue words from the number of specific memories he or she retrieved in 
response to the short-duration cue words, and reported that these difference scores 
correlated with BDI scores (r = 0.55).  That is, depression interacted with the load on 
executive capacity in their effect on AMT scores:  The increase in the average 
overgenerality of responses to long-duration cue words as compared to the average 





whose BDI scores indicated greater depressive symptomatology.  Respondents with 
greater depressive symptomatology apparently had more difficulty than less depressed 
respondents in complying with the AMT’s specificity instruction when this required them 
to  inhibit overgeneral memories that were automatically evoked by the long-duration cue 
words (Dalgleish et al., 2007). 
 In their seventh study, Dalgleish et al. manipulated the extent of the demand on 
executive control by coupling the AMT with a concurrent cognitive load.  The authors 
first administered the Digit Span subtest of the WAIS-III to 23 participants to determine 
each participant’s forward digit span.  Each participant was then tested with the BDI and 
with two versions of the AMT, a standard version of the test and version of the test that 
included a concurrent cognitive load.  In the concurrent load version, prior to each cue 
word the participant was presented with a string of digits two digits shorter than his or her 
forward digit span; participants were instructed to remember the digits for recall after 
retrieval of an autobiographical memory.  The cue word was then presented, the 
participant was allowed to retrieve and report an autobiographical memory, and the 
participant was then asked to repeat the digit string.  This sequence was repeated for each 
of 16 digit string/cue word pairs.  The authors calculated a difference score by subtracting  
the number of specific memories each participant retrieved in response to the concurrent 
load version of the AMT from the number of specific memories he or she had retrieved in 
response to the standard AMT, and reported that these difference scores correlated with 
BDI scores (r = 0.42).  That is, depression again interacted with the load on executive 
capacity in their effect on the overgenerality of AMT responses: Participants whose BDI 





to comply with the AMT’s specificity instruction whether or not they were 
simultaneously trying to remember a string of random digits.  However, participants 
whose BDI scores indicated a relatively elevated level of depressive symptomatology had 
greater difficulty complying with the AMT’s specificity instruction when they were 
simultaneously tasked with retaining a random digit string (Dalgleish et al., 2007). 
 Although the findings of the first seven studies published by Dalgleish et al. are 
consistent with an inference that instruction neglect resulting from executive impairment 
mediates the connection between depression and overgenerality of AMT responses,  the 
strength of that inference is qualified by the  confound discussed previously:  In all 
versions of the AMT in which participants are instructed to retrieve only specific 
memories, instruction neglect will have the effect of yielding a relatively overgeneral 
response pattern, i.e., exactly the same effect that is yielded by autobiographical 
overgenerality.  In their eighth study Dalgleish et al. modified the AMT’s instructions in 
such a way that instruction neglect and autobiographical overgenerality are counterposed 
rather than confounded.  Dalgleish et al. accomplished this by reversing the standard 
AMT’s specificity instruction:  In place of the test’s usual instruction that participants 
should retrieve only single-day autobiographical memories, in their eighth study 
Dalgleish instructed respondents as follows: 
The memory you recall should be of a certain category of event; in other words, a 
series of similar events that happened to you at different times. So, if I said the 
word “good,” it would not be okay to say “I had a good time at Jane’s party,” 
because that does not refer to a category of events. But it would be okay to say “I 
always enjoy the parties at my friend Jane’s house” because that refers to a 
category of events.  (Dalgleish et al., 2007, p. 36)   
 
Thus, participants were instructed to retrieve overgeneral autobiographical memories in 





reversed-instruction version of the AMT (rAMT) autobiographical overgenerality and 
instruction neglect have opposite effects on a respondent’s tendency to give overgeneral 
responses.  That is, if autobiographical overgenerality were the dominant process, then 
depressed participants should be better able to comply with the rAMT’s overgenerality 
instruction:  Their predominantly overgeneral autobiographical memories would make it 
easier to retrieve overgeneral memories.  On the other hand, if executive impairment and 
consequent instruction neglect were the dominant processes, then depressed participants 
should be just as unable to comply with the rAMT’s overgenerality instruction as they are 
unable to comply with the standard AMT’s specificity instruction:  They would respond 
to the rAMT haphazardly with whatever specific or overgeneral AM first came to mind, 
and such haphazard responding would, on average, be more specific than the responses of 
nondepressed participants who were able to utilize their unimpaired executive control to 
reliably comply with the rAMT’s instruction to retrieve overgeneral memories.   
 Dalgleish et al. administered the rAMT, the BDI, and the Operational Span Task 
(OSPAN, a measure of controlled attention) to 32 participants (Dalgleish et al., 2007).  
BDI scores were positively correlated with the specificity (4th root transformed) of 
memories retrieved in response to the rAMT (r = .35), that is, more depressed 
participants were more specific in their responses to the rAMT.  Moreover, OSPAN 
scores correlated negatively with BDI scores (r = -.41), and also correlated negatively 
with the specificity of rAMT responses, even after controlling for BDI scores (pr = -.49), 
that is, more depressed participants were impaired in their ability to exercise controlled 





they were to violate the rAMT’s overgenerality instruction and to retrieve specific 
autobiographical memories.  
 These results reported by Dalgleish et al. (2007) from their rAMT study, together 
with the results of the other studies discussed in this section, support an inference that at 
least one of the processes that underlie and mediate the connection between depression 
and overgenerality of AMT responses is instruction neglect – the extent to which 
participants are unable to retain the AMT’s specificity instruction in working memory or 




 Because the standard version of the AMT instructs participants to retrieve specific 
autobiographical memories and measures their compliance with this instruction, it is 
likely to confound instruction neglect (respondents’ inability to retain the instruction or 
unwillingness to comply with it) and autobiographical overgenerality (respondents’ 
characteristic tendency to remember their lives in overgeneral or specific terms).  Two 
studies have resolved this confound by removing any specificity instruction from the 
AMT.   The overgenerality or specificity of memories that respondents report in such an 
unconstrained condition should be a less confounded measure of the character of their 
spontaneous autobiographical remembering. 
 In the first of these two studies, Raes, Hermans, Williams and Eelen (2007) 
modified the AMT in two respects:  First, rather than requiring participants to retrieve 
memories in response to cue words,  participants were asked to complete eleven sentence 
fragments (e.g., “I still remember well how . . .”; “Last year . . .”; “The most important 





regarding whether their responses should be specific or overgeneral.   Raes et al. 
administered this sentence-completion minimal-instructions AMT (sc/miAMT), together 
with the BDI-II and the Visual Analogue Rumination Scale (VARS, a self-report of the 
tendency to engage in depressive rumination) to 197 university students whom the 
authors characterize as nonclinical.6  The overgenerality of sc/miAMT responses was 
positively correlated with BDI-II scores (r = 0.18);  that is, those participants with more 
severe self-reported depressive symptomatology tended to spontaneously retrieve more 
overgeneral autobiographical memories in response to the sc/miAMT (Raes et al., 2007).  
The overgenerality of sc/miAMT responses was also positively correlated with VARS 
scores (r = 0.15), that is, those participants who self-reported a greater tendency to 
engage in depressive rumination tended to spontaneously retrieve more overgeneral AMs 
in response to the sc/miAMT (Raes et al., 2007). 
 In the second of these two studies, Debeer, Hermans and Raes (2009) retained the 
AMT’s cue word format, but modified the test in two other respects: First, while the 
traditional version of the AMT allows participants to make their responses orally, Debeer 
et al. required participants to write their responses.  Second, Debeer et al. did not give 
participants any instruction regarding the specificity or overgenerality of their responses.  
Debeer et al. administered this written-response minimal-instructions AMT (wr/miAMT), 
together with the BDI-II and the Ruminative Response Scale (RRS, a self-report of the 
tendency to engage in depressive rumination) to 161 nonclinical university students.7  
The specificity of wr/miAMT responses was negatively correlated with BDI-II scores (r 
= -0.20), that is, participants who self-reported greater depressive symptomatology 
                                            





tended to spontaneously retrieve fewer specific AM’s in response to the wr/miAMT.  
Moreover, the specificity of wr/miAMT responses was also negatively correlated with 
RRS scores (r = -0.28), that is, those participants with a greater self-reported tendency to 
engage in depressive rumination tended to spontaneously retrieve fewer specific AM’s 
(Debeer et al., 2009). 
 If instruction neglect were the only mechanism underlying and mediating the 
association between depression and scores on the traditional version of the AMT,  one 
would expect that depression would not correlate with scores from versions of the AMT 
that omit any specificity instruction.  The report by Raes et al. (2007) that depression 
correlated with scores on the sc/miAMT, and the report by Debeer et al (2009) that 
depression correlated with scores on the wr/miAMT, suggest that instruction neglect is 
not the only mediating mechanism, but that autobiographical overgenerality may be an 
additional mediating mechanism.  That is, the reports by Raes et al. (2007) and Debeer et 
al. (2009) are consistent with an inference that individuals suffering from depression tend 
to be overgeneral in their spontaneous, intrapsychic autobiographical remembering, and 
that this characteristic overgenerality is part of what the AMT measures and contributes 
to the association between depression and the overgenerality of AMT scores. 
 As noted above, Raes et al. (2007) and Debeer et al. (2009) also report that the 
overgenerality of responses to their minimal-instruction AMT’s correlated with 
respondents’ self-reported tendencies to engage in depressive rumination.  This is 
relevant because Williams (2006) predicted that depressive rumination might result in 
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 autobiographical overgenerality.  That is, persons suffering from depression often tend to 
ruminate on overgeneral themes, and that ruminative overgeneral remembering may be 
reflected in overgeneral AMT responses.  The correlations between depressive 
rumination and overgeneral responses to the minimal-instruction AMT’s reported by 
Raes et al. (2007) and Debeer et al. (2009) are consistent with Williams’ prediction. 
 In sum, although AMT scores have been reported to correlate with current 
depression, to persist after the remission of depression, and to predict the susceptibility to 
and course of future depression, it is not completely clear what the test measures.  An a 
priori analysis of the test itself suggested that it could measure two separate processes 
that have been defined as (1) instruction neglect, and (2) autobiographical overgenerality.  
The published literature suggests that both of these processes may in fact be measured by 
and confounded in ATM scores, and that they both may underlie and mediate the 
association between depression and a tendency to retrieve overgeneral autobiographical 
memories in response to the AMT.  As described in the next section, the study objectives 




 The overall goal of this dissertation research project was to explore whether 
instruction neglect and autobiographical overgenerality are separate, dissociable 
processes each of which partially and separately mediates the association between 
depression and the overgenerality of responses to the tradition version of the AMT.  
Although “mediation” terminology has been used in the foregoing discussion to 
characterize the hypothesized causal relationships among depression, instruction neglect, 





AMT, a statistical mediation analysis was not within the objectives of this research 
project; rather, the objective here was to explore the patterns of correlations among these 
constructs as follows. 
 
Depression and the standard-instructions AMT 
 
 The first specific objective of this research project was to replicate the finding of a 
correlation between depression and overgenerality of responses to the standard version of 
the AMT, and to do so with a computerized version of the AMT that was developed in 
the principal investigator’s thesis research project (McCowin, 2007).  Other than being 
computerized, this version of the AMT was in all respects consistent with a standard 
version of the test, including a specificity instruction.  This test will be described in detail 
below, and is referred to hereinafter as the Standard-instruction Computerized AMT 
(siCAMT). 
 In the principal investigator’s thesis research project, although the overgenerality 
of responses to the siCAMT correlated positively with a measure of executive 
impairment (i.e., participants with greater executive impairment tended to be overgeneral 
in their responses), overgenerality did not correlate with depression.  Given the body of 
literature in which depression has been found to correlate with the overgenerality of 
responses to the AMT, the failure to detect any such correlation in the thesis research 
project was unexpected. Potential explanations for this null result were that measure of 
depression utilized in the thesis research project (the Zung Self-rating Depression Scale) 
was insufficiently reliable, and that the range of depressive symptomatology among the 





 In the current dissertation research project, the potential deficits in the design of 
the principal investigator’s thesis research project were remedied as follows:  Depression 
was measured with two instruments – the BDI-II and the HRSD – that have been used in 
prior studies in which depression has been found to correlate with the overgenerality of 
AMT responses (e.g., Debeer et al., 2009; Hermans et al., 2008; Raes et al., 2007; Raes et 
al., 2008); these two measures of depressive symptomatology are described below.  
Moreover, an effort was made to recruit research participants who manifested a relatively 
broad range of depressive symptomatology; the procedures that were employed to recruit 
participants for this study and the characteristics of the resulting sample of participants 
are described below.  
 
Depression and a minimal-instructions AMT 
 
 The second objective of this dissertation research project was to replicate the 
findings reported by Raes et al. (2007) and Debeer et al. (2009) of a correlation between 
depression and overgenerality of responses to aversion of the AMT that omitted any 
specificity instruction.  Neither of the minimal-instruction versions of the AMT utilized 
by Raes et al. (2007) or Debeer et al. (2009) was suitable for use in the present 
dissertation research project.  As discussed above, the sc/miAMT described by Raes et al. 
(2007) differed from the standard version of the AMT in two respects:  Not only did the 
sc/miAMT omit any specificity instruction, but in addition it required respondents to 
complete sentence fragments rather than retrieve autobiographical memories in response 
to cue words.  Likewise, the wr/miAMT described by Debeer et al. (2009) not only 
omitted any specificity instruction, but also required respondents to provide written rather 





standard version of the AMT in two respects, it would be difficult to interpret any 
differences between the scores on the siCAMT and the scores on either of these minimal-
instruction versions of the AMT.   
 To facilitate comparisons between patterns of responses to the siCAMT and 
patterns of responses to a minimal-instruction AMT, a version of the AMT was 
developed and administered in the current study that differs from the siCAMT in only  
one respect – the omission of a specificity instruction.  This minimal-instruction version 
of the test will be referred to hereinafter as the Minimal-instruction Computerized AMT 
(miCAMT), and is described in detail below.  This miCAMT was utilized to attempt to 
replicate the findings of Raes et al. (2007) and Debeer et al. (2009). 
 
siCAMT, executive dysfunction, and depressive rumination 
 
 Based on the literature reviewed above, it was predicted that autobiographical 
overgenerality and instruction neglect would both underlie and mediate the association 
between depression and scores on the siCAMT.  It was further predicted that 
autobiographical overgenerality results in part from depressive rumination, and could 
therefore be indirectly assessed with measures of depressive rumination.  Likewise, it was 
predicted that instruction neglect results in part from an impairment of executive 
functioning, and could therefore be indirectly assessed with measures of executive 
impairment.  Based upon these predictions, it was hypothesized that scores on the 
siCAMT should correlate both with measures of depressive rumination and with 
measures of executive dysfunction.  The third objective of this dissertation research 






miCAMT, depressive rumination, and executive dysfunction 
 
 Based on the literature reviewed above, it was predicted that autobiographical 
overgenerality underlies and mediates the association between depression and scores on 
the miCAMT, but that instruction neglect does not mediate that relationship.  Therefore, 
it was hypothesized that scores on the miCAMT should correlate with depressive 
rumination, but not with executive dyscontrol.  Moreover, it was hypothesized that the 
correlation between depressive rumination and miCAMT scores would be greater than 
the correlation between depressive rumination and siCAMT scores.  The fourth objective 




 These research objectives are summarized in the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1:  Depression will correlate positively with overgenerality of 
responses to the siCAMT. 
Hypothesis 2:  Depression will correlate positively with overgenerality of 
responses to the miCAMT. 
Hypothesis 3: Scores on the siCAMT will correlate both with depressive 
rumination and with executive dysfunction. 
  Hypothesis 4: Scores on the miCAMT will correlate with depressive 
 rumination but not with executive dysfunction. 
Hypothesis 5:  The correlation between scores on the miCAMT and 
depressive rumination will be greater than the correlation between scores on the 
















 Nine instruments were employed in this dissertation research project:  the 
miCAMT, the siCAMT, two measures of depressive symptomatology, three measures of 
impairment of executive capacity, and two measures of depressive rumination.  These 
instruments are described in detail below. 
 
Measures of autobiographical memory 
 
 This study utilized two measures of the tendency to retrieve overgeneral 
autobiographical memories – the miCAMT and the siCAMT.  Each of these measures is 
a variation on the AMT originally described by Williams and Broadbent (1986).  In the 
miCAMT and siCAMT, as in Williams and Broadbent’s original test, participants are 
asked to describe an autobiographical memory in response to each of a series of cue 
words.  A participant’s overgenerality score is the proportion of retrieved memories that 
are not single–day memories. 
 The miCAMT and siCAMT both differ in  one respect from the test originally 
described by Williams and Broadbent and typically used in this body of research:  
Whereas the original and most common form of the AMT is administered by a researcher 





computer-administered.  The principal investigator developed this computer-based format 
of the AMT as part of a thesis project (McCowin, 2007).  In order to distinguish these 
tests from the manually-administered versions of the AMT, they will be referred to 
hereinafter collectively as Computerized AMTs (CAMTs). 
 The miCAMT and siCAMT were each created using E-Prime 1.0, running on a 
Compaq Pentium-4 personal computer.  All of the instructions, practice items, and 
memory cues comprising each test are visually presented to participants on a 15- inch 
NEC MultiSync A700+ monitor.  Simultaneously with this visual presentation, subjects 
hear a synchronized recording of the principal investigator’s voice reading the 
instructions, practice items, and memory cues.  This computer-based presentation allows 
the principal investigator to leave the testing room while participants retrieve and report 
autobiographical memories in response to the CAMTs’ cue words, thereby minimizing 
experimenter effects.  Moreover, the headset over which participants hear the auditory 
presentation screens out potentially distracting extraneous audio stimuli, thereby further 
standardizing the presentation of the CAMTs.  The participants’ responses to the cue 
words are picked up by a microphone incorporated into the headset and are digitally 
recorded for later analysis. 
 In all of the foregoing respects, the miCAMT and siCAMT are identical to one 
another.  However, the two tests differ in one respect:  While the siCAMT includes a 
specificity instruction similar to that described by Williams and Broadbent (1986), the 
miCAMT omits any specificity instruction.  As discussed above, this difference between 







 In the miCAMT, each participant is given the following instructions via computer 
monitor and headset: 
  I am interested in your autobiographical memories.  I am going to 
read out a number of words.  For each one, I want you to remember something 
from your life that the word reminds you of. 
  After I read out each word, you will have 60 seconds to think of a 
memory from your life that the word reminds you of, and to start telling me about 
it.  It’s fine if it takes longer than 60 seconds to describe the memory, as long as 
you start within the 60 seconds.  Just speak into the microphone, and your 
memory will be recorded. 
  The memory can be from any time in your life and may be about 
something trivial or important.   
  As soon as the memory comes to you, press the "Space" bar and 
describe the memory to me.  Press the "Enter" key when you are done.  
The participant is then presented with 15 cue words, one at a time.  As stated in 
the instructions, after each cue word is presented, the participant has 60 seconds 
to begin to describe an autobiographical memory of which the cue word reminds 
him or her.  By omitting any instruction regarding the temporal specificity of the 
memories participants are to retrieve, this test was designed to minimize any 
demand on the participant’s ability and/or willingness to retain and comply with 





the miCAMT was intended to measure the participant’s unconstrained memory 




 In the siCAMT, each participant is given the following instructions via computer 
monitor and headset: 
 I am interested in more of your memories for events that have happened in 
your life.  I will again read a number of words, and I would again like you to 
remember an event from your life that each word reminds you of. 
  You will again have 60 seconds to retrieve a memory and begin telling me 
about it.  And once again, the event can have occurred at any time in your life, 
and may be trivial or important. 
 However, this time I would like each of your memories to be of a specific 
event, meaning that it lasted no longer than a single day, and that you recall some 
specific details about it.    
 For example, in response to the word "party" you could report a memory 
of, "Going to a party with my roommate last Monday in the Student Union," or 
you could report a memory of, "The surprise birthday party my parents threw for 
me when I turned 12." 
 However, it would not be appropriate to give a more extended, nonspecific 
memory such as, "There were lots of parties last summer."  Let's begin with a few 
practice items. 
 Tree.  Now, remember a specific event from your life that this word 





 [The following appeared if a participant failed to press “Space” within 60 
seconds:  Were you unable to remember an event within the 60 seconds?  This is a 
practice item, so take as much time as you need to think of a specific event from 
your life that the word “tree” reminds you of.  Press the “Space” bar when the 
memory comes to you.  Now, tell me enough about the memory that I can tell that 
it was specific.  Press the "Enter" key when you are done.] 
 Was your memory specific?  That is, did you remember something that 
occurred on one day or less, and did you include some factual detail?  If your 
memory was specific in this way, press the "Enter" key to move to the next 
practice item.  But if your memory was nonspecific, try to think of a specific 
memory –one particular occasion plus some factual detail.  As soon as the 
specific memory comes to you, press the "Space" bar and describe the memory to 
me.  When you are done, press the "Enter" key. 
 Let's try another practice item. 
 Umbrella.  Again, remember a specific event from your life that this word 
reminds you of.  As soon as the memory comes to you, press the "Space" bar. 
 [The following appeared if a participant failed to press “Space” within 60 
seconds.  Were you unable to remember an event within the 60 seconds?  This is a 
practice item, so take as much time as you need to think of a specific event from 
your life that the word “umbrella” reminds you of.  Press the “Space” bar when 
the memory comes to you.  Now, tell me enough about the memory that I can tell 





 If your memory was specific, press the "Enter" key to move to the test 
items.  But if your memory was nonspecific, try to think of a specific memory –one 
particular occasion plus some factual detail.  As soon as a specific memory comes 
to you, press the "Space" bar and describe the memory to me.  When you are 
done, press the "Enter" key.  
 Now let's move to the test items.  I will read one word at a time.  After 
each, try to think of a specific memory.  Press the "Space" bar when the memory 
comes to you, and tell me enough about the memory that I can tell it was specific.  
When you are done, click the "Enter" key. 
Each participant is then presented with 15 cue words, one at a time.  As stated in the 
instructions, after each cue word is presented, the participant has 60 seconds to begin to 
describe an autobiographical memory of which the cue word reminds him or her.  This 
siCAMT is essentially equivalent to the computerized version of the test that was 
developed as part of the principal investigator’s thesis project (McCowin, 2007).  The 
instructions regarding the temporal specificity of retrieved memories, together with the 
practice items that are intended to ensure that participants understand the specificity 
instructions, are similar to the instructions and practice items in the original test described 
by Williams and Broadbent (1986).  This test was designed to measure the extent to 
which participants retrieve specific autobiographical memories when they are explicitly 






Cue Word Sets 
 The cue words used in the two CAMTs in this study were drawn from the sets of 
cue words used in two prior studies that reported finding significant correlations between 
depression and overgenerality of responses to the AMT.  Burnside, Startup, Byatt, 
Rollinson, and Hill (2004) used a set of 15 cue words, five of which were intended to 
have a positive emotional valence (happy, relieved, eager, sunny, proud), five of which 
were intended to have a negative emotional valence (ugly, guilty, failure, worse, 
hopeless) and five of which were intended to have a neutral emotional valence (grass, 
gigantic, absence, bread, search).  An additional set of 15 cue words were used by 
Dalgleish et al. (2007), five of which were intended to have a positive emotional valence 
(love, prosperity, romance, summer, vacation8), five of which were intended to have a 
negative emotional valence (bereavement, cancer, depression, disease, slavery), and five 
of which were intended to have a neutral emotional valence (adolescence, century, 
eternity, past, permanent).  These two sets of 15 cue words were combined to form a set 
of 30 cue words, and that list was then divided into the following two cue sets, each 
containing the same number cues with positive, negative, and neutral emotional valence: 
Cue Set A 
 adolescence bread cancer disease eternity
 failure gigantic hopeless permanent prosperity
 relieved summer sunny ugly vacation 
                                            
8
 Dalgleish et al. (2007) used the cue word holiday.  In order to have an equivalent cue word within modern 





Cue Set B 
 absence bereavement century depression eager  
 grass guilty happy love past  
 proud romance search slavery worse 
These two lists were counter-balanced between the two CAMTs:  Half of the participants 
received the miCAMT with Cue Set A and the siCAMT with Cue Set B; the other half of 
the participants received the miCAMT with Cue Set B and the siCAMT with Cue Set A.  
Within each test, the order of cue presentation was rerandomized for each participant.  
 
Reliability data for CAMTs  
 
 As noted above, the siCAMT is essentially equivalent to the CAMT that was 
developed and administered in the principal investigator’s thesis research project.  The  
coefficient alpha of responses to the CAMT in the thesis study was 0.81 (McCowin, 
2007).   
 
Measures of depression 
 
 Depressive symptomatology was measured by two well-known paper-and-pencil 




The BDI-II is a 21-item self-report of the severity of depressive symptomatology 
(Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996).  The developers of the BDI-II report coefficient alphas of 
0.92 for outpatients and 0.93 for college students.  The developers of the BDI-II report 
that its 21 items were designed to correspond to the diagnostic criteria for depression as 





(DSM-IV, 1994), and that the correlation between scores on the BDI-II and scores on the 




The HRSD is a 21-item structured interview that assesses the severity of 
depressive symptomatology (Hamilton, 1960).  Coefficient alphas for the HRSD have 
been reported ranging from 0.73 (Riskind, Beck, Brown, & Steer, 1987) to 0.83 (Moras, 
di Nardo, & Barlow, 1992).  In the current study, the HRSD was administered using a 
Structured Interview Guide for the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale which is reported 
to improve inter-rater reliability (J. B. Williams, 1988).   
 
Measures of executive dysfunction 
 
 Dalgleish et al. (2007) suggest that the particular aspect of executive function that 
tends to be impaired in depression and that results in the overgenerality of responses to 
the AMT is the ability to retain and comply with the AMT’s specificity instruction in the 
face of distraction from, and the  need to inhibit, inappropriately overgeneral candidate 
memory responses.  Therefore, in this study the impairment of executive control was 
operationalized with four measures that assess the capacity to withstand distractions, to 
inhibit inappropriate responses, and/or to retain information in working memory. 
 
Visual Search Task 
 
 The Visual Search Task assesses the relative slowing of visual processing that is 
made effortful by the need to inhibit responses to distracting stimuli.  In the principal 
investigator’s thesis research project it was found that scores on the Visual Search Task 





greater slowing in effortful processing as measured by the Visual Search Task were 
significantly more likely to give overgeneral responses to the AMT (McCowin, 2007). 
The Visual Search Task was developed by Hammar et al. (2003b) as a measure of 
the impairment of effortful information processing relative to automatic information 
processing.  Each participant is seated before a computer monitor on which appears a 
series of 40 stimuli screens, half of which contain a vertical black rectangle – the target – 
and the half of which do not.  Participants are told that their reaction time is being tested, 
and that as quickly as possible after each screen appears, they should press the “L” key on 
a computer keyboard if the screen contains the target, and the “A” key if it does not.  
Unbeknownst to the participants, half of the screens contain vertical grey distracters and 
the other half do not; there are thus four classes of screens, an example of each of which 
is reproduced in Figure 2.  One quarter of the screens contain only horizontal black 
rectangles and no target (exemplified by screen a in Figure 2); another quarter of the 
screens contain horizontal black rectangles plus  one target (exemplified by screen b in 
Figure 2; the target has been circled for ease of reference).  Scanning these two classes of 
screens for the presence or absence of the target is intended to be relatively easy, 
requiring only automatic processing (Å. Hammar, Lund, & Hugdahl, 2003a).  A third 
quarter of the screens contain both horizontal black rectangles and vertical grey 
rectangles (exemplified by screen c in Figure 2); the final quarter of the screens contain  
one target, black horizontal rectangles, and vertical grey rectangles (exemplified by 
screen d in Figure 2; the target has been circled for ease of reference).   The presence of 
the grey distracters complicates the scanning of these classes of screens for the presence 






a                     b                 c                              d 
 
Figure 2.  Examples of VST stimuli.  The target vertical rectangles in screens b  
and d have been circled for ease of reference. 
 
effortful processing.  The measured dependent variable is the latency of a participant’s 
responsive key stroke after the onset of each screen.  Hammar et al. (2003b) reported that 
depression tends to slow the average latency of responses to the screens that include the 
vertical grey distracters, but not to slow the latency of response to the simpler screens, 
i.e., depression impairs effortful information processing but not automatic processing. 
 The version of the Visual Search Task that was utilized in the principal 
investigator’s thesis project and in the current project uses stimuli screens provided by 
Dr. Hammar (2006).  The test was created using E-Prime 1.0, running on a Compaq 
Pentium-4 personal computer.  The instructions, stimuli screens, and feedback screens 
comprising the Visual Search Task are visually presented to participants on a 15-inch 
NEC MultiSync A700+ monitor.  Simultaneously with the visual presentation of the 
Visual Search Task’s instructions, participants hear a synchronized recording of the 
principal investigator’s voice reading those instructions.  The test’s instructions are 
reproduced in Appendix A.   
 Participants are given four practice screens,  one of each of the types reproduced 
in Figure 2; following each of these four practice screens the participants receive 





blocks of 20 screens each, separated by a 30-second pause.  The order of presentation of 
the 20 stimuli screens within each of these blocks is rerandomized for each participant. 
No feedback is given during the test phase.  The E-Prime 1.0 program automatically 
records the latency between the presentation of each of the 40 stimuli screens and the 
participant’s strike of the “L” or “A” key.  The mean latency (in milliseconds) of each 
participant’s responses to simple screens is taken as that participant’s automatic 
processing latency.  The mean latency (in milliseconds) of each participant’s responses to 
the complicated screens is taken as that participant’s effortful processing latency.  Each 
participant’s automatic processing latency is subtracted from his or her effortful 
processing latency to yield a difference score that is taken as the relative slowing of 
effortful relative to automatic processing.  It was this difference score that was found to 
correlate significantly with autobiographical overgenerality in the principal investigator’s 
thesis project (McCowin, 2007). 
 In the principal investigator’s thesis study, the participants’ responses to the 
simple stimuli screens had a coefficient alpha of 0.90; responses to the complex stimuli 
screens had a coefficient alpha of 0.89 (McCowin 2007). 
 
D-KEFS Inhibition and Inhibition/switching Subtests 
 
Two of the scores provided by the Delis-Kaplan (D-KEFS) Color-Word 
Interference Test (Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001) were used as measures of the capacity 
to inhibit inappropriate responses to distracting stimuli; in addition, one of these two 
scores was also used as a measure of the capacity to retain and switch between two 
different instruction sets.  The D-KEFS Color-Word Interference Test – an elaboration of 





shown a page containing 50 evenly-spaced color patches (green, red, or blue) and are 
instructed to name the different colors as quickly as possible.  The time required by a 
participant to complete this task is taken as a measure of his or her baseline color-naming 
speed.  In Condition 2, participants are shown a page containing 50 evenly-spaced, 
printed color names (green, red, and blue) each printed in black ink, and are instructed to 
read the words as quickly as possible.  The time required by a participant to complete this 
task is taken as a measure of his or her baseline word-reading speed. 
 In Condition 3 of the D-KEFS Color-Word Interference Test, participants are 
shown a page containing 50 evenly-spaced, printed color names (green, red, and blue), 
each of which is printed in a randomly differing color of ink (green, red, and blue).  
Participants are instructed to name the color of the ink in which each word is printed.  
The time required by a participant to complete this task is assumed to reflect his or her 
ability to inhibit the more automatic response of reading each word, and was used as the 
second measure of impairment of executive control in the present study.   
 In Condition 4 of the D-KEFS Color-Word Interference Test, participants are 
shown a page that, like the stimulus page used in Condition 3, contains 50 evenly-spaced 
color names, each of which is printed in a different ink color.  In contrast to the Condition 
3 stimulus page, however, on the Condition 4 stimulus page half of the color names are 
enclosed within small boxes.  Participants are instructed that if a word is enclosed in one 
of the small boxes, then they should read the word, but that if a word is not enclosed in a 
box, then they should name the color of the ink in which the word is printed.  The time 
required by a participant to complete this task is assumed to reflect both his or her 





memory and to switch between two different response rules.  Each participant’s 
completion time was used as the third measure of impairment of executive control in the 
current study. 
 The D-KEFS Technical Manual (Delis et al., 2001) states that the overall test-
retest reliability for the Color-Word Interference Test’s Condition 3 and Condition 4 
scores are, respectively, 0.75 and 0.65.  However, the test-retest reliabilities differ by age 
group:  For ages 8-19 the reliabilities are, respectively, 0.90 and 0.80; for ages 20-49 the 
reliabilities are, respectively, 0.71 and 0.52; and for ages 50-89 the reliabilities are, 
respectively, 0.75 and 0.65 (Delis et al., 2001). 
 Only limited information is available regarding the validity of D-KEFS Color-
Word Interference Test scores.  The D-DEFS Technical Manual (Delis et al., 2001) states 
that scores for the Color-Word Interference Test’s Condition 3 correlate with the 
Wisconsin Card Sort Test (WCST) Categories score at r = -0.53, and with the WCST 
Perseverative Responses score at r = 0.23; scores for Condition 4 correlate with the 
WCST Categories score at r = -0.31, and with the WCST Perseverative Responses score 
at r = 0.20.  Beaman, Pushkar, Etezadi, Bye, and Conway (2007) reported that the speed 
with which participants completed the traditional Stroop task (similar to Condition 3 of 
the D-KEFS version) loaded heavily onto a “cognitive factor” (s2=0.67) which in turn 
correlated significantly with the number of specific memories retrieved in response to a 
version of the AMT (r2=0.42).  However, Spinhoven et al. (2006) reported that the speed 
with which participants completed the traditional Stroop task (similar to Condition 3 of 





retrieved in response to a version of the AMT by previously depressed but currently 
euthymic participants. 
 
Operational Span Task 
 
The Automated Operational Span Task (AOSPAN) is a computer-based working 
memory task that was developed and published by Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, and Engle 
(2005), and that assesses the capacity to hold information in working memory while 
performing a distracting cognitive task.  Ros, Latorre, and Serrano (2010) have reported 
that scores on a similar measure of working memory executive processes correlated with 
the number of specific memory responses to the AMT.  Therefore, the AOSPAN was 
included in this study as a measure of the impairment of working memory in particular, 
and as the fourth measure of impairment of executive functioning in general. 
A participant being tested with the AOSPAN sits in front of a computer screen on 
which is displayed a simple arithmetic formula (e.g., (1 x 2) + 1 = ?).  The participant is 
instructed to solve the formula in his or her head, and to click the computer mouse as 
soon as he or she has the answer.  A new screen appears on which is displayed a digit 
(e.g., 3) and two boxes, one containing the word “true” and the other the word “false.”  
The participant is instructed to click the appropriate box.  A new screen appears on which 
is displayed a letter that the participant is supposed to remember (F, H, J, K, L, N, P, Q, 
R, S, T, or Y); the letter is displayed for 800ms.  On the next screen is displayed another 
arithmetic problem, then another to-be-remembered letter, and so forth.  These 
formula/letter pairs are grouped into 15 sets, with set sizes ranging from three to seven 
pairs long, and three sets of each size, for a total of 75 formula/letter pairs.  The order in 





are rerandomized for each participant. After each of the 15 formula/letter sets, the 
participant is asked to remember the letters in order.  Although the AOSPAN calculates a 
number of scores, the score that was used in the present study is the total number of 
letters recalled in the correct position. 
 The developers of the AOSPAN report an estimated coefficient alpha of 0.78, and 
a test-retest reliability of 0.83 (Unsworth et al., 2005).  AOSPAN scores have been 
reported to correlate with scores on a different operational span task at r = 0.45, and with 
a measure of fluid intelligence at r= 0.38 (Unsworth et al., 2005).   
 
Measures of depressive rumination 
 
 Depressive rumination was assessed by two paper-and-pencil self-report measures 




The RRS is a 22-item self-report of the tendency to react to one’s depression by 
dwelling upon the causes, symptoms, and consequences of depression.  A copy of the 
RRS as utilized in this study is attached as Appendix B.  The RRS was originally 
developed by Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow, who reported a Cronbach's alpha of  0.89, 
and reported that RRS scores correlated significantly (r = 0.62) with participants’ “use of 
ruminative responses to depressed mood in a 30-day diary study” (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991, p. 117). 
 The RRS has been utilized in a number of reported AMT studies.  For example, 
Debeer et al. (2009) reported that RRS scores correlated at r = -0.28 with the specificity 





formed by averaging standardized scores on the RRS and RSS correlated with the 
specificity of AMT responses at r = -0.51; Raes, Hermans, Williams, Demyttenaere et al. 
(2006) reported that a composite of RRS and RSS scores correlated with the specificity of 




The RSS is a 13-item self-report of the tendency to respond to one’s depression 
with introspective and isolating rumination.  A copy of the RSS as utilized in this study is 
attached as Appendix C.  The RSS was developed by Conway, Csank, Holm, and Blake 
(2000), who reported a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.91 and a test-retest reliability of 0.70.  
Conway et al. also reported that the RSS shares more unique variance with the BDI-II 
than does the RRS (2000). 
Like the RRS, the RSS has been used in a number of reported AMT studies.  For 
example,  Raes, Hermans, Williams, Beyers et al. (2006) reported that RSS scores 
correlated with the specificity of AMT responses at r = -0.43.  As noted in the previous 
section, Raes et al. (2005) and Raes et al. (2006) reported that a composite of RRS and 
RSS scores correlated with the specificity of AMT responses at, respectively, r = -0.51 




 One of the limitations of the thesis project upon which this dissertation project 
builds was a restriction of range of depressive symptomatology among the research 
participants (McCowin, 2007).  In order to include participants manifesting a broader 





from three sources: (1) the participant pool of the University of Utah’s Department of 
Educational Psychology, (2) the University of Utah’s Counseling Center, and (3) the 
mass-testing participant pool of the University of Utah’s Department of Psychology.  
 
Educational Psychology participant pool 
 
 The Department of Educational Psychology at the University of Utah has 
organized a participant pool as a source of research participants for student and faculty 
research projects.  This participant pool comprises students at the University of Utah who 
are enrolled in EDPS 2600, 3030, 3110, and 5151, and who, as part of the requirements 
for those courses, are required either to participate in research projects for a set number of 
hours or to complete a short research project of their own.  This pool has received 
separate approval from the University of Utah’s Institutional Review Board (IRB).   
 Participants were recruited from this participant pool as follows:  At the beginning 
of each university semester, a list of available research projects in which students in 
EDPS 2600, 3030, 3110, and 5151 could participate to satisfy their research participation 
requirement was published on an internet web page.  Students were allowed to select 
among the available research projects.  The web page provided space for students to sign 
up for research participation appointments at predetermined times.  The web page also 
informed students of the location of the room where all testing for the present research 
project was conducted.  Upon their arrival at the testing room at the appointed time, 
students were given a brief overview of the research project and an informed consent 
document that had been approved by the IRB.  (A copy of the IRB-approved informed 





consent document (in fact, not a single student declined to execute the document), then 
testing immediately commenced. 
 This participant pool was the source from which the bulk of research participants 
for the principal investigator’s thesis project was recruited.  Based on that experience, it 
was anticipated that no more than 5 to 10% of participants recruited from this participant 
pool would manifest any significant level of depressive symptomatology.  In fact, the 
mean of the BDI-II scores of the 42 participants recruited from the Educational 
Psychology participant pool for the current research project was 7.52, which is in the 
range suggesting minimal depression symptomatology.  Of these 42 participants, 38 had 
BDI-II scores in the 0 and 13 range, suggestive of minimal depressive symptomatology;1 
had a BDI-II score in the 14 and 19 range, suggestive of mild depressive 
symptomatology; 3 had BDI-II scores in the 20 and 28 range, suggestive of moderate 
depressive symptomatology; and 0 had BDI-II scores of 29 or above, which would have 
been suggestive of severe depression (Beck et al., 1996). 
 
University of Utah Counseling Center 
 
 In order to recruit participants manifesting a higher severity of depressive 
symptomatology, participants for the current research project were also recruited from 
among the clients of the University of Utah’s Counseling Center (UCC) as follows:  The 
UCC’s receptionists were briefed on the nature of this research project and were given a 
supply of blank informed consent documents.  The receptionists then mentioned this 
research project to ongoing UCC clients and/or new UCC clients at the outset of their 
initial intake appointments.  The receptionists told such prospective participants that they 





theaters as compensation for participating in the research.  Any UCC client who was 
interested in participating in the project was given a copy of the informed consent 
document and asked to read through it.  If the UCC client was still interested in 
participating in the project, the client was asked to write his or her telephone number on 
the informed consent document, and to execute the document indicating his or her 
interest in participating in the project and authorizing the UCC to disclose his or her 
name and telephone number to the principal investigator.  The executed informed consent 
documents were periodically collected from the UCC, and the prospective research 
participants were contacted to schedule testing appointments.   
 It was not logistically possible to limit recruitment of UCC clients to those who 
had been diagnosed with depression and/or were experiencing depressive 
symptomatology.  Nevertheless, it was expected that UCC clients would manifest a 
higher severity of depressive symptomatology than research participants recruited from 
the Educational Psychology participant pool.  In fact, the mean of the BDI-II scores of 
the 15 participants recruited from the UCC for the current research project was 16.2, 
which is within the range suggesting mild depression.  Of these 15 participants, 6 had 
BDI-II scores in the 0 to 13 range, suggestive of minimal depressive symptomatology; 6 
had BDI-II scores in the 14 and 19 range,  suggestive of mild depressive 
symptomatology; 1 had a BDI-II score in the 20  and 28 range, suggestive of moderate 
depressive symptomatology; and 2 had BDI-II scores of 29 or above, suggestive of severe 






Psychology mass-testing participant pool 
 
 In order to recruit more research participants manifesting an elevated severity of 
depressive symptomatology, participants who had endorsed such symptomatology on 
mass-testing were recruited from the participant pool organized by the Department of 
Psychology at the University of Utah.  This participant pool, which has received separate 
IRB approval, comprises students at the University of Utah who are enrolled in PSY 
1010.  At the beginning of each semester, all of these students undergo mass-testing, i.e., 
they are administered a battery of tests that assess them on a variety of issues.  In order to 
identify students who endorsed an elevated severity of depressive symptomatology, 10 
depression-screening questions assessing typical symptoms of depression were included 
in the mass-testing battery.   (A copy of the 10 depression-screening questions is attached 
as Appendix E.)  The Department of Psychology communicated to the principal 
investigator the names, test scores, and contact information of the students who 
participated in mass testing.  Research participants were recruited from among those with 
the highest scores on the 10 depression-screening questions. 
 Although the depression-screening scores of research participants recruited from 
the Psychology mass-testing participant pool were not included in the data analysis in this 
research project, on the basis of these participants’ elevated depression-screening scores, 
it was anticipated that they would manifest elevated depressive symptomatology as 
measured by the BDI-II.  In fact, the mean BDI-II score of the 18 participants recruited 
from the Psychology mass-testing participant pool for the current research project was 
20.56, which is in the range suggesting moderate depression.  Of these 18 participants, 5 





symptomatology; 3 had BDI-II scores in the 14 to 19 range, suggestive of mild 
depressive symptomatology; 5 had BDI-II scores in the 20 to 28 range, suggestive of 
moderate symptomatology, and 5 had BDI-II scores of 29 or greater, suggestive of severe 
depression (Beck et al., 1996). 
 Overall, this participant recruitment procedure succeeded in increasing the range 
of depressive symptomatology among the research participants in this study.  A total of 
76 participants were recruited from these three sources.  Data from 1 participant were lost 
because of technical problems with the computer equipment.  Of the remaining 75 
participants, 49 had BDI-II scores in the 0 to 13 range, suggestive of minimal depressive 
symptomatology;10 had BDI-II scores in the 14 to 19 range, suggestive of mild 
depressive symptomatology; 9 had BDI-II scores in the 20 to 28 range, suggestive of 
moderate depressive symptomatology; and 7 had BDI-II scores of 29 or above, 




 Participants were tested individually in a single, preappointed testing session 
lasting approximately one hour and 40 minutes.  The principal investigator personally 
administered all of the testing in Room 308F of Milton Bennion Hall at the University of 
Utah.  All of the testing was conducted during the UCC business hours to allow 
immediate referral to the UCC should any participant become acutely distressed by the 
testing experience.  This referral procedure was not in fact utilized during any of the 
testing in this project.  
 Upon each participant’s arrival at a testing session, the principal investigator 





retain and one to be retained by the principal investigator; in the case of UCC clients, one 
of the copies was the document that the participant had previously signed).  Each 
participant was then given a verbal overview of the phases of the testing as detailed 
below, and was given the opportunity to ask questions about the project.  Very few 
participants had any such questions.  On a very limited number of occasions, a participant 
asked questions a full answer to which would have threatened the validity of testing 
results; in these instances, in accordance with the informed consent document, the 
participant was told that full answers to his or her questions would be provided at the end 
of testing. The participant was then asked to execute the informed consent document 
indicating his or her informed consent to participate in the project.  (UCC clients were 
asked to execute the unsigned copy of the consent document.) 
 Before testing commenced, each participant was informed that his or her 
responses would be held strictly confidential and would be identified only by an 
anonymous participant number.  Each participant was informed that confidentiality was 
subject only to exceptions in the case of threatened imminent harm to self or an identified 
other, or in the case of reported abuse.  At no point during the testing in this research 
project did any exception to confidentiality need to be invoked. 
 The sequence of testing of each participant was conducted according to one of 
two alternating checklists – Protocol Order #1 and Protocol Order #2 (attached as 
Appendix F). The initial four instruments were the same for each of these checklists: the 
miCAMT, the siCAMT, the BDI-II and the HRSD were administered to each participant 
in that order.  However the order of administration of the remaining instruments was 





Each participant was asked to take a seat at a computer terminal in the testing 
room and was given brief verbal instructions regarding the operation of the computer (use 
of the mouse, clicking in on-screen boxes to advance, speaking into the microphone, 
etc.).  The principal investigator then started the miCAMT and left the testing room.  All 
of the miCAMT’s instructions and stimuli were presented via a computer screen and 
headphones, and the participant’s oral responses were digitally recorded for later scoring.  
The miCAMT typically took approximately 10 minutes to complete.  At the conclusion 
of the miCAMT, the participant was instructed via the computer screen and headphones 
to alert the principal investigator that he or she had finished.  
 The principal investigator then re-entered the testing room and collected basic 
demographic information (gender and age).  The principal investigator then started the 
computer-based siCAMT and again left the testing room.  All of the siCAMT’s 
instructions and stimuli were presented via a computer screen and headphones, and the 
participant’s oral responses were digitally recorded for later scoring.  The siCAMT 
typically took approximately 15 minutes to complete. At the conclusion of the siCAMT, 
the participant was again instructed via the computer screen and headphones to alert the 
principal investigator that he or she had finished. 
The principal investigator then re-entered the testing room, briefly explained the 
BDI-II and asked the participant to fill out that self-report.  The principal investigator 
remained in the testing room to respond to any questions the participant might have about 
the BDI-II.  When the participant had completed the BDI-II, the principal investigator 





to complete.  The principal investigator then told the participant that the testing protocol 
required a brief break, and engaged in informal small-talk to fill that break.   
The order of the remaining assessments depended upon whether the participant 
was being assessed using Protocol Order #1 or Protocol Order #2.  Pursuant to Protocol 
Order #1, the principal investigator next administered the D-KEFS Color-Word 
Interference Test; this assessment typically took approximately 5 minutes to complete.  
The principal investigator then asked the participant to complete the RRS self-report; this 
assessment typically took 3 or 4 minutes to complete.  The principal investigator then 
started the computer-based Visual Search Task and left the testing room.  All of the 
Visual Search Task’s instructions and stimuli were presented via a computer screen and 
headphones.  Completion of this assessment typically took approximately 5 minutes.  At 
the conclusion of the Visual Search Task, the participant was instructed to alert the 
principal investigator that he or she had finished. The principal investigator then 
informed the participant that the testing protocol required another brief break, and again 
engaged in informal small-talk to fill the break.  The principal investigator then asked the 
participant to complete the RSS self-report; this assessment typically took 2 or 3 minutes 
to complete.  The principal investigator then started the computer-based AOSPAN and 
left the room.  All of the AOSPAN’s instructions and stimuli were presented via a 
computer screen; there was no audio component to this test and the headphones were 






If the participant were being assessed pursuant to Protocol Order #2 rather than 
#1, then the last 5 assessments were be presented in the following sequence:  AOSPAN, 
RSS, Visual Search Task, brief break, RRS, and D-KEFS Color-Word Interference Test. 
 After the completion of all testing, each participant was debriefed in accordance 
with the Debriefing Outline attached as Appendix G and was allowed to ask any 
questions relevant to the research project.  Participants recruited from the UCC were then 
given two movie tickets.  All participants were asked not to discuss the details of the 















Description of data collected 
Equivalence of counterbalanced factors 
 The mean miCAMT score for the 39 participants who received cue word set A in 
that test was 0.23 (SD = 0.18); the mean miCAMT score for the 36 participants who 
received cue word set B in that test was 0.28 (SD = 0.18).  These two mean scores were 
not significantly different (t(73) = -1.14, p = 0.26 (2-tailed)). 
 The mean siCAMT score for the 39 participants who received cue word set A in 
that test was 0.76 (SD = 0.20); the mean siCAMT score for the 36 participants who 
received cue word set B in that test was 0.75 (SD = 0.16).  These two mean scores were 
not significantly different (t(73) = 0.02, p = 0.98 (2-tailed)). 
 The mean score on condition 3 of the D-KEFS Color-Word Interference Test for 
the 39 participants who were assigned to protocol order number 1 was 44.97 (SD = 8.70); 
the mean score on that test for the 36 participants who were assigned to protocol order 
number 2 was 47.81 (SD = 9.97).  These two means were not significantly different 
(t(73) = -1.31, p = 0.19 (2-tailed)). 
 The mean score on condition 4 of the D-KEFS Color-Word Interference Test for 
the 39 participants who were assigned to protocol order number 1 was 50.36 (SD = 9.05); 





number 2 was 53.03 (SD = 9.05).  These two means were not significantly different 
(t(73) = -1.28, p = 0.21 (2-tailed)). 
 The mean composite depressive rumination score of the 39 participants who were 
assigned to protocol order number 1 was -0.26 (SD = 2.02); the mean composite 
rumination score of the 36 participants who were assigned to protocol order number 2 
was 0.28 (SD = 1.78).  These two means were not significantly different (t(73) = -1.25, p 
= 0.22 (2-tailed)). 
 The mean score on the Visual Search Task for the 39 participants who were 
assigned to protocol order number 1 was 211.56 (SD = 133.45); the mean score on that 
test for the 36 participants who were assigned to protocol order number 2 was 199.21 (SD 
= 112.64).  These two means were not significantly different (t(73) = 0.43, p = 0.67 (2-
tailed)). 
 The mean OSPAN score of the 39 participants who were assigned to protocol 
order number 1 was 54.44 (SD = 13.20); the mean score on that test for the 34 
participants who were assigned to protocol order number 2 was 55.91 (SD = 15.57).  
These two means were not significantly different (t(71) = -0.44, p = 0.66 (2-tailed)). 
 Thus, counterbalancing the participants on cue set and protocol order did not have 





 Seventy-six participants were originally recruited to participate in this project.  








 As summarized in Figure 3, the participants ranged in age from 18 to 47, with a 




 As summarized in Figure 4, 46 of the participants (61%) were female.  Twenty-




As summarized in Figure 5, scores on the miCAMT ranged from 0.0 to 0.75.  The 
mean score was 0.25 and the standard deviation was 0.18.  The Cronbach’s alpha for 
participants who received cue set A in the miCAMT was 0.61.  For participants who 
received cue set B in the miCAMT, the Cronbach’s alpha was 0.52.  The Cronbach’s 




 As summarized in Figure 6, scores on the siCAMT ranged from 0.27 to 1.0.  The 
mean score was 0.76, and the standard deviation was 0.18.  The Cronbach’s alpha for 
participants who received cue set A in the siCAMT was 0.57.  For participants who 
received cue set B in the siCAMT, the Cronbach’s alpha was 0.77.  The Cronbach’s alpha 
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Figure 3.Participant age distribution. 
 
Figure 3.  Participant age distribution. 









   
 
 
   Figure 5.  miCAMT scores. 








 As summarized in Figure 7, the participants’ scores on the BDI-II ranged from 0 
to 33.  The mean score was 12.39, and the standard deviation was 9.05.  Forty-nine of the 
participants’ scores fell in the range of 0 to 13, suggesting minimal depression.  Ten of 
the participants’ scores fell in the range of 14 to 19, suggesting mild depression.  Nine of 
the participants’ scores fell in the range of 20 to 28, suggesting moderate depression.  The 
remaining 7 participants’ scores were 29 or above, suggesting severe depression.  The 




As summarized in Figure 8, the participants’ scores on the HRSD ranged from 0 
to 36.  The mean score was 12.17, and the standard deviation was 7.77.  The Cronbach’s 
alpha for the participants’ responses to the HRSD was 0.85. 
 
Composite depression scores 
 
 Scores on the BDI-II were highly correlated with scores on the HRSD (r (74) = 
0.83, p< 0.01).This association supports an inference that the two measures converge on a 
common construct, and therefore supports combining the scores on the BDI-II and HRSD 
into a composite depression score.  To form this composite score, z-scores were 
calculated for BDI-II and HRSD scores based on the sample of participants in this study.  
Each participant’s BDI-II z-score and HRSD z-score was summed to yield that 







   
 
 





   Figure 7.  BDI-II scores. 





   
 
 





depression scores ranged from -2.94 to 4.90.  The mean score was 0.0 and the standard 
deviation was 1.9. 
 
Executive dysfunction scores 
 
Visual search task scores 
 
 As summarized in Figure 10, the participants’ mean latencies to respond to 
noncomplicated stimuli in the Visual Search Task (i.e., automatic processing) ranged 
from 393ms to 1222ms.  The mean response latency to noncomplicated stimuli was 
737ms and the standard deviation was 167ms.  Cronbach’s alpha was 0.80. 
 As summarized in Figure 11, the participants’ mean latencies to respond to the 
complicated stimuli in the Visual Search Task (i.e., effortful processing) ranged from 
472ms to 1480ms.  The mean response latency to complicated stimuli was 943ms and the 
standard deviation was 205ms.  Cronbach’s alpha was 0.90. 
 As summarized in Figure 12, the differences between each participant’s mean 
automatic processing latency and mean effortful processing latency ranged from -194ms 
to 461ms.  The mean difference was 206ms and the standard deviation was 123ms. 
 
D-KEFS Color-Word Interference scores 
 
 As summarized in Figure 13, the participants’ raw scores on the Inhibition 
Condition of the D-KEFS Color-Word Interference Test ranged from 30 seconds to 74 
seconds.  The mean score was 46 seconds, and the standard deviation was 9 seconds. 
 As summarized in Figure 14, the participants’ raw scores on the 







   
 
 
   
  
 
   Figure 10.  VST automatic processing (ms). 





   
 
   
 
   Figure 12.  VST effort – automatic (ms). 





   
 
 





from 31 seconds to 73 seconds.  The mean score was 52 seconds, and the standard 
deviation was 9 seconds. 
 
 Operational Span Task scores 
 
As summarized in Figure 15, the participants’ AOSPAN Total Scores ranged 
from 9 to 75.  The mean score was 55 and the standard deviation was 14. 
The correlations among these four measures of impairment of executive function 
were modest and/or insignificant:  Visual Search Task scores did not correlate with 
scores on the Inhibition Condition of the D-KEFS Color-Word Interference Test (r (74) = 
0.04, p = 0.75), scores on the Inhibition/Switching Condition of the D-KEFS Color-Word 
Interference Test (r (74) = 0.01, p = 0.91), or scores on the OSPAN (r (74) = 0.07, p = 
0.54).  Scores on the Inhibition Condition of the D-KEFS Color-Word Interference Test 
were modestly correlated with scores on the Inhibition/Switching Condition of the D-
KEFS Color-Word Interference Test (r (74) = 0.48, p<0.01) and with scores on the 
OSPAN (r (74) = -0.31, p< .01).  Scores on the Inhibition/Switching Condition of the D-
KEFS Color-Word Interference Test were modestly correlated with scores on the 
OSPAN (r (74) = -0.27, p< 0.05).  The lack of any strong associations among the data 
collected with these four measures suggests that they do not measure a single unified 
construct.  The scores on these measures were therefore not combined to form a 


















 As summarized in Figure 16, the participants’ scores on the RRS ranged from 23 
to 69.  The mean score was 40 and the standard deviation was 12.  The Cronbach’s alpha 




As summarized in Figure 17, the participants’ scores on the RSS ranged from 13 
to 53.  The mean score was 26 and the standard deviation was 11.  The Cronbach’s alpha 
for RSS scores of participants in this study was 0.94. 
 
Composite depressive rumination scores 
 
 Scores on the RRS were highly correlated with scores on the RSS (r (74) = 0.84, 
p< 0.01).  This association supports an inference that the two measures converge on a 
common construct, and therefore supports combining the scores on the RRS and RSS into 
a composite depressive rumination score.  To form this composite score, z-scores were 
calculated for RRS scores and RSS scores based on the sample of participants in this 
study.  Each participant’s RRS z-score and RSS z-score was summed to yield that 
participant’s composite depressive rumination score. 
As summarized in Figure 18, the participants’ composite depressive rumination 






   
   
 




Figure 16.  RRS scores. 
















 As set forth above, the research hypotheses upon which this dissertation project 
was structured are stated in terms of predicted correlations among the variables that were 
measured and derived in this study.  The observed correlations are set forth in Table 3.  
As discussed below in connection with the individual research hypotheses, the data 
collected in this study fail to support any of those hypotheses.  
 
Table 3.  Correlation table.  **  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 



















1 .430** -.053 -.144 -.031 -.104 -.057 -.008 




 1 .092 .063 .033 -.129 -.122 .153 




  1 .731** -.015 .176 .091 -.079 




   1 .080 .046 -.030 -.012 




    1 .038 .013 .072 




     1 .479** -.313** 





      1 -.265* 
       .023 
OSPAN  
 








 The first research hypothesis was that depression would correlate positively with 
the overgenerality of responses to the siCAMT. Contrary to that hypothesis, depression, 
operationalized as the sum of each participant’s z-scores on the BDI-II and HRSD, was 
not found to correlate with siCAMT scores (r(74) = 0.09, p = 0.44).  Post-hoc analyses 
were conducted to test whether this null result might be an artifact of some aspect of the 
research design or of the form (as opposed to the content) of the data collected. 
To test whether the null result might have been caused by forming a composite 
depression variable from BDI-II and HRSD scores, separate correlations were calculated 
between siCAMT scores and BDI-II scores, and between siCAMT scores and HRSD 
scores.  Neither BDI-II scores (r(74) = 0.04, p = 0.76) nor HRSD scores (r(74) = 0.14, p 
= 0.24) were found to correlate with siCAMT scores.  This suggests that deriving a 
composite depression score comprising BDI-II scores and HRSD scores did not cause the 
null result with respect to the first research hypothesis. 
To test whether the null result might have been caused by recruiting participants 
from three different populations – the Educational Psychology Participant Pool, the 
University Counseling Center, and the Psychology Mass-testing Participant Pool – 
separate correlations were calculated for participants recruited from each source.   
 Among participants recruited from the Educational Psychology Participant Pool, 
the mean BDI-II score was 7.5 (SD = 6.0), the mean HRSD score was 8.1 (SD = 5.5), 
and the mean composite depression score was -1.1 (SD =1.3).  Histograms summarizing 
the depression scores of this subgroup of participants are included as Figures 19, 20, and 





   
  
 
   
 
Figure 19.  EdPs BDI-II scores. 















II score was 16.2 (SD = 7.0), the mean HRSD score was 17.0 (SD = 7.9), and the mean 
composite depression score was 1.0 (SD = 1.7).  Histograms summarizing the depression 
scores of this subgroup of participants are included as Figures 22, 23, and 24.  Among 
participants recruited from the Psychology Mass-testing Participant Pool, the mean BDI-
II score was 20.6 (SD= 9.3), the mean HRSD score was 17.7 (SD = 6.6), and the mean 
composite depression score was 1.6 (SD = 1.7).  Histograms summarizing the depression 
scores of this subgroup of participants are included as Figures 25, 26, and 27.  As 
demonstrated by the respective mean depression scores of these three subgroups, and as 
illustrated by the histograms, the participants within the three groups present differing 
levels of depressive symptomatology.  This was the intent of recruiting participants from 
these three different sources – to sample a broad range of depressive symptomatology.  
For ease of comparison, histograms reflecting depressive symptomatology within the 
aggregate sample are reproduced as Figures 28, 29, and 30. 
Correlations between siCAMT scores and each of the three depression scores 
(BDI-II scores, HRSD scores, and composite depression scores) were calculated 
separately for participants recruited from each of the three sources.  For participants 
recruited from the Educational Psychology Participant Pool, no correlation was found 
between siCAMT scores and BDI-II scores (r(41) = 0.19, p = 0.24), HRSD scores (r(41) 
= 0.05, p = 0.75), or composite depression scores (r (41) = 0.12, p = 0.44).  For 
participants recruited from the University Counseling Center, no correlation was found 
between siCAMT scores and BDI-II scores (r(14) = 0.42, p = 0.12); however, siCAMT 
scores did correlate with HRSD scores (r(14) = 0.52, p = 0.05) and composite depression 





   
 
   
   
 
 
   
Figure 22.  UCC BDI-II scores. 





   
 
   
  
Figure 24.  UCC Composite Depression. 





   
 
   
 
 
Figure 26.  Psychology HRSD scores. 





   
 
 




Figure 28.  Aggregate BDI-II scores. 














Testing Participant Pool, no correlations were found between siCAMT scores and BDI-II 
scores (r(17) = -0.20, p = 0.44), HRSD scores (r(17) = 0.17, p = 0.503), or composite 
depression scores (r(17) = -0.03, p = 0.90). 
Thus, two of these nine post hoc analyses yielded correlations that are significant 
at an uncorrected α of 0.05.  However, because such repeated analyses inflate the 
probability of a Type 1 error, it is appropriate to apply a Bonferonni correction: α = 
0.05/n = 0.05/9 = 0.006.  Utilizing this Bonferonni corrected α, none of the nine post hoc 
analyses yields a significant correlation.  This suggests that combining the scores of 
participants recruited from three different sources did not cause the null result. 
As illustrated by the histogram attached as Figure 6, the siCAMT scores collected 
in this study have a negative skew; the nonnormality of these data is confirmed by the 
Shapiro-Wilk test of  normality: w(75) = 0.93; p< 0.05.  Likewise, as illustrated by the 
histogram attached as Figure 30, the composite depression variable has a positive skew; 
the nonnormality of these data is confirmed by the Shapiro-Wilk test: w(75) = 0.95; p< 
0.05.  To test the possibility that the null result in connection with the first research 
hypothesis resulted from this nonnormality in the data distributions, the data were 
transformed to approximate normality and the correlation was recalculated. 
Because the siCAMT scores were negatively skewed, they were first reflected by 
multiplying by -1, and 2 was added to each score so that all scores were 1.0 or greater.  
No transformation of these data was able to achieve normality, but the inverse-square 
transformation yielded the distribution that was closest to normal (w(75) = 0.96, p = 
0.01), and was therefore used for post hoc analysis.  A histogram illustrating the inverse-














Because composite depression scores were positively skewed, they were not 
reflected.  But because the scores ranged from -2.94 to 4.90, 4 was added to each score so 
that all scores were 1.0 or greater.  The square root transformation of these data was 
normally distributed (w(75) = 0.98, p> 0.05), and was therefore used for post hoc 
analysis.  A histogram illustrating the square root transformed composite depression 
scores is included as Figure 32. 
The inverse-square transformed siCAMT scores did not correlate with the square-
root transformed composite depressions scores (r(74) = 0.10, p = 0.40).  This suggests 
that the nonnormal distributions of the data did not cause the null result. 
To test whether the hypothesized association between siCAMT scores and 
depression might emerge if analysis were restricted to participants exhibiting extremes of 
depressive symptomatology, separate mean siCAMT scores were calculated for the 20 
participants with the highest composite depression scores (Mn = 0.76; SD = 0.19) and the 
20 participants with the lowest composite depression scores (Mn = 0.74; SD = 0.21).  The 
two groups’ mean siCAMT scores were not significantly different (t(38) = -0.40; p> 
0.05).  Thus, limiting the analysis to the participants manifesting the extremes of 
depressive symptomatology does not alter the null result. 
 Given the foregoing analyses, it appears that in the data collected in this study, 
there was no association between siCAMT scores and depressive symptomatology as 




 The second research hypothesis was that depression would correlate positively 





   
  
 





depression, operationalized as the sum of each participant’s z-scores on the BDI-II and 
HRSD, was not found to correlate with miCAMT scores (r(74) = - 0.05, p = 0.66).  Post-
hoc analyses were conducted to test whether this null result might be an artifact of the 
research design or of the form of the data collected. 
To test whether the null result might have been caused by forming a composite 
depression variable from BDI-II and HRSD scores, separate correlations were calculated 
between miCAMT scores and BDI-II scores, and between miCAMT scores and HRSD 
scores.  Neither BDI-II scores (r(74) = -0.06, p = 0.63) nor HRSD scores (r(74) = -0.04, p 
= 0.71) were found to correlate with miCAMT scores.  This suggests that deriving a 
composite depression score comprising BDI-II scores and HRSD scores did not cause the 
null result with respect to the second research hypothesis. 
To test whether the null result might have been caused by recruiting participants 
from three different populations, separate correlations were calculated for participants 
recruited from each source.  Histograms summarizing the BDI-II, HRSD, and composite 
depression scores for participants recruited from each of the sources are included as 
Figures 19 –27. 
For participants recruited from the Educational Psychology Participant Pool, no 
correlation was found between miCAMT scores and BDI-II scores (r(41) = -0.09, p = 
0.57), HRSD scores (r(41) = -0.09, p = 0.58), or composite depression scores (r (41) = -
0.09, p = 0.56).  For participants recruited from the University Counseling Center, no 
correlation was found between miCAMT scores and either HRSD scores (r(14) = 0.36, p 
= 0.18) or composite depression scores (r(14) = 0.49, p = 0.06); however, miCAMT 





from the Psychology Mass-Testing Participant Pool, no correlations were found between 
miCAMT scores and BDI-II scores (r(17) = -0.16, p = 0.53), HRSD scores (r(17) = -0.09, 
p = 0.73), or composite depression scores (r(17) = -0.14, p = 0.59). 
Thus, one of these nine post hoc analyses yielded a correlation that is significant 
at an uncorrected α of 0.05.  However, utilizing the Bonferonni corrected α = 0.05/n = 
0.05/9 = 0.006, none of the nine post hoc analyses yields a significant correlation.  This 
suggests that combining the scores of participants recruited from three different sources 
did not cause the null result. 
As illustrated by the histogram attached as Figure 5, the miCAMT scores 
collected in this study have a positive skew; the nonnormality of these data is confirmed 
by the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality: w(75) = 0.92; p< 0.05.  Because the scores ranged 
from 0.0 to 0.75, 1 was added to each score so that all of the scores were 1.0 or greater.  
The inverse square transformation of these data was normally distributed (w(75) = 0.97, 
p> 0.05), and was used for post hoc analysis.  A histogram illustrating the distribution of 
the inverse-square-transformed miCAMT scores is included as Figure 33. 
As illustrated in the histogram attached as Figure 32, the square-root 
transformation of the composite depression scores is normally distributed, and was 
therefore used for post hoc analysis.  
 The inverse-square transformed miCAMT scores did not correlate with the square-
root transformed composite depression scores (r(74) = 0.04, p = 0.74).  This suggests that  
the nonnormal distributions of the data did not cause the null result with respect to the 





   
 
 





 To test whether the hypothesized association between miCAMT scores and 
depression might emerge if analysis were restricted to participants exhibiting extremes of 
depressive symptomatology, separate mean miCAMT scores were calculated for the 20 
participants with the highest composite depression scores (Mn = 0.24; SD = 0.18) and the 
20 participants with the lowest composite depression scores (Mn = 0.31; SD = 0.23).  The 
two groups’ mean miCAMT scores were not significantly different (t(38) = 1.05; p> 
0.05).  Thus, limiting the analysis to the participants manifesting the extremes of 
depressive symptomatology does not alter the null result. 
 Given the foregoing analyses, it appears that in the data collected in this study, 
there was no association between miCAMT scores and depressive symptomatology as 




The third research hypothesis was that scores on the siCAMT would correlate both 
with depressive rumination and with executive dysfunction.  Contrary to this hypothesis, 
siCAMT scores were not found to correlate with either depressive  rumination, 
operationalized as the sum of each participant’s z-scores on the RSS and RRS, (r(74) = 0.06, 
p = 0.59) or with any of the measures of impairment of executive capacity – the Visual 
Search Task (r(74) = 0.03, p = 0.78), the Inhibition Condition of the D-KEFS Color-Word 
Interference Test (r(74) = -0.13, p = 0.27), the Inhibition/Switching Condition of the D-
KEFS Color-Word Interference Test (r(74) = -0.12, p = 0.30), or the AOSPAN (r(74) = 0.15, 
p = 0.19).  Post hoc analyses were conducted to test whether these null results might be 





 To test whether the null result might have been caused by forming a composite 
depressive rumination variable from RSS and RRS scores, separate correlations were 
calculated between siCAMT scores and RSS scores, and between siCAMT scores and 
RRS scores.  Neither RSS scores (r(74) = 0.10, p = 0.39) nor RRS scores (r(74) = 0.02, p 
= 0.86) were found to correlate with siCAMT scores.  This suggests that deriving a 
composite depressive rumination score comprising RSS and RRS scores did not cause the 
null result with respect to the third research hypothesis. 
To test whether the null result might have been caused by the failure to form a 
composite executive dysfunction variable, a composite variable was formed by 
calculating and summing z-scores for each of the individual measures of executive 
dysfunction – the Visual Search Task, Inhibition Condition of the D-KEFS Color-Word 
Interference Test, Inhibition/Switching Condition of the D-KEFS Color-Word 
Interference Test, and OSPAN.  A histogram summarizing the distribution of this 
composite executive dysfunction measure is included as Figure 34.   
 The composite executive dysfunction scores did not correlate with siCAMT 
scores (r(74) = -0.15, p = 0.21).  This suggests that the failure to calculate a composite 
executive dysfunction measure, and instead testing the associations between siCAMT 
scores and scores on the four individual measures of executive dysfunction did not cause 
the null result with respect to the third research hypothesis. 
To test whether the null result with respect to the third research hypothesis might 
have been caused by recruiting participants from three different populations, separate 
correlation analyses were performed for participants from each recruitment source.  





   
 





and the composite executive dysfunction score for participants recruited from each of 
these sources are included as Figures 35 - 49. 
Correlations between siCAMT scores and scores on each of the four individual 
measures of executive dysfunction together with the composite executive dysfunction 
scores were calculated separately for participants recruited from each of the three 
sources.  For participants recruited from the Educational Psychology Participant Pool, no 
correlation was found between siCAMT scores and scores on the Visual Search Task 
(r(41) = -0.13, p = 0.43), the Inhibition Condition of the D-KEFS Color-Word 
Interference Test (r(41) = -0.10, p = 0.55), the Inhibition/Switching Condition of the D-
KEFS Color-Word Interference Test (r(41) = -0.22, p = 0.17), the OSPAN (r(41) = 0.15, 
p = 0.36), or the composite executive dysfunction scores (r(41) = -0.23, p = 0.14).  For 
participants recruited from the University of Utah Counseling Center, no correlation was 
found between siCAMT scores and scores on the Visual Search Task  (r(14) = 0.15, p = 
0.59), the Inhibition Condition of the D-KEFS Color-Word Interference Test (r(14) = -
0.15, p = 0.58), the Inhibition/Switching Condition of the D-KEFS Color-Word 
Interference Test (r(14) = 0.04, p = 0.88), the OSPAN (r(14) = 0.37, p = 0.20), or the 
composite executive dysfunction scores (r(14) = -0.06, p = 0.83).  Finally, for 
participants recruited from the Psychology Mass-testing Participant Pool, no correlation 
was found between siCAMT scores and scores on the Visual Search Task (r(17) = 0.31, p 
= 0.21), the Inhibition Condition of the D-KEFS Color-Word Interference Test (r(17) = -
0.16, p = 0.52), the Inhibition/Switching Condition of the D-KEFS Color-Word 
Interference Test (r(17) = -0.12, p = 0.65), the OSPAN (r(17) = 0.09, p = 0.71), or the 





   
  
 
   
 
 
Figure 35.  EdPs Stroop Inhibition (sec.). 





   
 
 
   
  
 
Figure 37.  EdPs Effort – Auto (ms.). 





   
 
 
   
 
Figure 39.  EdPs Composite Executive Dysfunction. 





   
 
 
   
 
 
Figure 41.  UCC Stroop Inhibition/Switching (sec.). 





   
 
 
   
 
Figure 43.  UCC OSPAN Total. 





   
 
 
   
 
Figure 45.  Psychology Stroop Inhibition (sec.). 





   
 
 




Figure 47.  Psychology Effort – Auto (ms.). 




















suggests that the failure to find any association between scores on the siCAMT and the 
measures of executive dysfunction in this study did not result from the recruitment of 
participants from three different sources. 
Histograms summarizing the scores on the two individual measures of depressive 
rumination and the composite depressive rumination scores for participants recruited 
from each of the three sources are included as Figures 50 - 58.  Correlations between 
siCAMT scores and each of these three depressive rumination scores were calculated 
separately for participants recruited from each of the three sources.  For participants 
recruited from the Educational Psychology Participant Pool, no correlation was found 
between siCAMT scores and scores on the RRS (r(41) = 0.12, p = 0.46), the RSS (r(41) = 
0.20, p = 0.21), or the composite depressive rumination scores (r(41) = 0.17, p = 0.29).  
For participants recruited from the University of Utah Counseling Center, no correlation 
was found between siCAMT scores and scores on the RRS (r(14) = 0.38, p = 0.16), the  
RSS  (r(14) = 0.31, p = 0.26), or the composite depressive rumination scores (r(14) =  
0.36, p = 0.19).  Finally, for participants recruited from the Psychology Mass-testing 
Participant Pool, no correlation was found between siCAMT scores and scores on the 
RRS (r(17) = -0.20, p = 0.42), the RSS (r(17) = -0.04, p = 0.88), or the composite 
depressive rumination scores (r(18) = -0.13, p = 0.61).  These results suggest that the 
failure to find any association between scores on the siCAMT and the measures of 
depressive rumination in this study did not result from the recruitment of participants 
from three different sources. 
As illustrated by the histogram attached as Figure 6, the siCAMT scores have a 





   
 
 
   
 
 
Figure 50.  EdPs RRS scores. 





   
 
 
   
 
 
Figure 52.  EdPs Composite Depressive Rumination. 





   
 
 
   
 
 
Figure 54.  UCC RSS scores. 





   
 
 
   
 
 
Figure 56.  Psychology RRS scores. 





   
 
 





data (summarized in the histogram attached as Figure 31) approaches normality.  That 
transformation of the siCAMT scores was used for post hoc analysis regarding the third 
research hypothesis. 
 As illustrated by the histogram attached as Figure 18, the composite depressive 
rumination scores collected in this study have a positive skew; the nonnormality of these 
data is confirmed by the Shapiro-Wilk test of  normality: w(74) = 0.92; p< 0.05.  Because 
the composite depressive rumination scores range from -2.48 to 4.26, 4 was added to 
each score so that all of the scores were greater than 1.0.  No transformation of these data 
was able to achieve normality, but the Log10 transformation yielded the distribution that 
was closest to normal (w(75) = 0.953, p = 0.008), and was therefore used for post hoc 
analysis.  A histogram illustrating the Log10-transformed composite depressive 
rumination scores is included as Figure 59. 
The composite executive dysfunction scores, summarized in Figure 35, were 
normally distributed (w(74) = 0.987, p> 0.05). 
 The inverse-square siCAMT scores did not correlate with either the composite 
executive dysfunction scores (r(73) = -0.15, p = 0.21), or the LOG10 transformed 
composite depressive rumination scores (r(74) = 0.08, p = 0.48).  This suggests that the 
null result for the third research hypothesis did not result from the nonnormal 
distributions of the data.  
Given the foregoing analyses, it appears that in the data collected in this study, 
there was no association between siCAMT scores and either depressive rumination as 





   
 
 





Task, the Inhibition Condition or the Inhibition/Switching Condition of the D-KEFS 




The fourth research hypothesis was that scores on the miCAMT would correlate 
with depressive rumination but not with executive dysfunction. Contrary to this 
hypothesis, depressive rumination operationalized as the sum of each participant’s z-
scores on the RSS and RRS was not found to correlate with miCAMT scores (r(74) = -
0.14,p = 0.22).  Post hoc analyses were conducted to test whether this null result might be 
an artifact of the research design or of the form of the data collected. 
To test whether the null result might have been caused by forming a composite 
depressive rumination variable from RRS and RSS scores, separate correlations were 
calculated between miCAMT scores and RRS scores, and between miCAMT scores and 
RSS scores.  Neither RRS scores (r(74) = -0.18, p = 0.11) nor RSS scores (r(74) = -0.09, 
p = 0.44) were found to correlate with miCAMT scores.  This suggests that deriving a 
composite depressive rumination score comprising RRS and RSS scores did not cause the 
null result with respect to the fourth research hypothesis. 
To test whether the null result with respect to the fourth research hypothesis might 
have been caused by recruiting participants from three different populations, separate 
analyses were conducted for participants from each recruitment source.  Histograms 
summarizing the RRS, RSS, and composite depressive rumination scores for participants 
recruited from each of these sources are included as Figures 50-58.   
Correlations between miCAMT scores and each of these three depressive 





three sources.  For participants recruited from the Educational Psychology Participant 
Pool, no correlation was found between miCAMT scores and scores on the RRS (r(41) = 
0.08, p = 0.60), scores on the RSS (r(41) = 0.14, p = 0.39), or the composite depressive 
rumination scores (r(41) = 0.12, p = 0.46).  For participants recruited from the University 
of Utah Counseling Center, no correlation was found between miCAMT scores and 
scores on the RRS (r(14) = -0.33, p = 0.24), scores on the RSS (r(14) = -0.07, p = 0.81), 
or the composite depressive rumination scores (r(14) = -0.21, p = 0.46).  Finally, 
however, for participants recruited from the Psychology Mass-testing Participant Pool, 
significant correlations were found between miCAMT scores and scores on the RRS 
(r(17) = -0.53, p = 0.02), scores on the RSS (r(17) = -0.50, p = 0.03), and the composite 
depressive rumination scores (r(18) = -0.55, p = 0.02).   
Thus, three of these nine post hoc analyses yielded correlations that are significant 
at an uncorrected α of 0.05.  However, utilizing the Bonferonni corrected α = 0.05/n = 
0.05/9 = 0.006, none of the nine post hoc analyses yields a significant correlation.  This 
suggests that the failure to find any association between scores on the miCAMT and the 
measures of depressive rumination in this study did not result from the recruitment of 
participants from three different sources. 
As illustrated by the histogram attached as Figure 5, the miCAMT scores 
collected in this study have a positive skew.   The inverse square transformation of these 
data, summarized in the histogram attached as Figure 33, was normally distributed (w(75) 
= 0.97, p > 0.05), and was used for post hoc analysis.   
As illustrated by the histogram attached as Figure 18, the composite depressive 





transformation of these data succeeded in producing a normal distribution, the Log10 
transformation yielded the distribution that was closest to normal (w(75) = 0.953, p = 
0.008) (summarized in the histogram attached as Figure 59), and was therefore used for 
post hoc analysis.   
 The inverse-square transformed miCAMT scores did not correlated with the Log10 
transformed composite depressive rumination scores (r(74) = 0.08, p = 0.51).  This suggests 
that the null result with respect to the fourth research hypothesis was not caused by the 
nonnormality of the data. 
 Given the foregoing analyses, it appears that in the data collected in this study, 
there was no association between miCAMT scores and depressive rumination as 




 The fifth research hypothesis was that the correlation between scores on the 
miCAMT and depressive rumination would be greater than the correlation between 
scores on the siCAMT and depressive rumination.  Given the failure to find any such 
correlations and the discussion of these null results discussed above, no further discussion 















 In the 24 years since Williams and Broadbent (1986) first described the AMT, a 
substantial body of research has replicated the basic finding that a tendency to report 
overgeneral autobiographical memories in response to the AMT correlates with 
depression (e.g., van Vreeswijk & de Wilde, 2004).  It remains unclear, however, what 
this tendency to make overgeneral AMT responses actually signifies.  The purpose of this 
dissertation research project was to test whether this tendency might be driven by two 
separate processes, each of which has been suggested in the literature:  (1) the propensity 
of depressed persons to remember their lives in overgeneral rather than specific terms 
(defined herein as autobiographical overgenerality); and (2) the predisposition of 
depressed persons to neglect an instruction such as the AMT’s instruction that they 
should report only specific memories (defined herein as instruction neglect). 
 Two computerized versions of the AMT were employed – a standard-instruction 
version in which participants were instructed to retrieve only specific autobiographical 
memories (defined above as the siCAMT), and a minimal-instruction version in which 
participants were asked to retrieve autobiographical memories, but were given no 
instruction regarding the specificity or generality of those memories (defined above as the 
miCAMT).  It was predicted that the overgenerality of participants’ responses to the 





That is, a participant might report overgeneral memories in response to the siCAMT for 
either or both of two different reasons – he has a preponderance of overgeneral rather 
than specific autobiographical memories and/or he tends to neglect the specificity 
instruction and report whatever memory comes first to mind, be it overgeneral or 
specific.  By contrast, it was predicted that the overgenerality of participants’ responses 
to the miCAMT would reflect only autobiographical overgenerality.  That is, because the 
miCAMT lacked any specificity instruction, a participant’s tendency to neglect such 
instructions could have no effect; rather, a participant’s tendency to report overgeneral 
memories in response to the unconstrained miCAMT would reflect only the characteristic 
overgenerality of her autobiographical memories. 
 The first and second research hypotheses were, respectively, that depression 
would correlate with scores on the siCAMT and scores on the miCAMT.  These 
hypothesized correlations would have simply replicated previously reported results. 
 The third research hypothesis was that scores on the siCAMT would correlate 
both with depressive rumination and with executive dysfunction.  Depressive rumination 
is presumed to be one of the processes underlying autobiographical overgenerality.  
Likewise, executive dysfunction is presumed to be one of the processes underlying 
instruction neglect.  The hypothesized correlations would therefore have supported an 
inference that both autobiographical overgenerality and instruction neglect had effects 
upon siCAMT scores. 
 The fourth research hypothesis was that scores on the miCAMT would correlate 





pattern would support an inference that autobiographical overgenerality had an effect 
upon siCAMT scores, but that instruction neglect had no such effect. 
 Finally, the fifth research hypothesis was that depressive rumination would 
correlate more strongly with miCAMT than with siCAMT scores.  This hypothesized 
pattern would support an inference that miCAMT scores were a relatively pure measure 
of autobiographical overgenerality, while siCAMT scores confounded autobiographical 
overgenerality and instruction neglect. 
None of these hypotheses was supported by the data collected in this study.  
Depression correlated neither with scores on the siCAMT nor with scores on the 
miCAMT.  Nor did depressive rumination or executive dysfunction correlate with scores 
on either the siCAMT or the miCAMT.  The possible explanations and implications of 
these null results are discussed below. 
 
Null result regarding hypothesis 1 
 
The failure to detect any correlation between depression and siCAMT scores was 
not only contrary to the first research hypothesis, but was also unexpected and contrary to 
a significant body of published research.9  This is, however, the principal investigator’s 
second null result in this area of research:  In a thesis research project that utilized a 
CAMT that was essentially identical to the siCAMT, no correlation between depression 
                                            
9
 Among the 15 participants recruited from the University Counseling Center, and utilizing uncorrected α’s, 
siCAMT scores were found to correlate with HRSD scores and composite depression scores.  These 15 
participants were “clinical” in that they had all sought mental health services; in this respect they differed 
from the participants recruited from the two departmental participant pools.  As discussed above, the 
association between depression and over-general AMT responses is reportedly robust in clinical 
populations, but is less so in nonclinical populations.  It is tempting to speculate that the over-generality of 
AMT responses is associated not with a respondent’s depression per se, but with the participant’s clinical 
status, i.e., having sought clinic treatment for one’s depressive symptomatology.  However, given the small 
number of participants recruited from the University Counseling Center, and given the inflation of Type 1 





and overgenerality of CAMT responses was detected (McCowin, 2007).  The null result 
in that thesis research project was tentatively imputed to several possible problems that 
were remedied in the current research project. 
 
Aspects of this study that should have enhanced its capacity to 
to detect the hypothesized correlation  
 
A first apparent problem with the design of the principal investigator’s thesis 
research study was the instrument that was employed to measure the degree of depressive 
symptomatology – the Zung Self-rating Depression Scale (Zung), an instrument whose 
reliability has been questioned (Gotlib & Cane, 1989).  It was possible that the 
unreliability with which this instrument measured depression introduced error sufficient 
to preclude a statistically significant correlation between depression and CAMT scores.  
In the current project, in order to ensure a more reliable measure of depression, both the 
BDI-II and the HRSD were administered.  Each of these measures of depressive 
symptomatology has been frequently utilized in AMT research (e.g., Debeer et al., 2009; 
Raes, Hermans, Williams, Beyers et al., 2006; Raes et al., 2005; Raes, Hermans, 
Williams, Demyttenaere et al., 2006; Raes et al., 2007). The scores from these two 
instruments were combined to derive the depression variable.  It was hoped that this 
procedure would yield a more reliable and valid measure of depression, and thereby 
facilitate the detection of the predicted correlation with siCAMT scores. 
A second apparent problem with the principal investigator’s thesis study was the 
restriction of the range of depressive symptomatology among the research participants.  
All of the Zung scores of the research participants in the thesis project fell within the 





depressive symptomatology were recruited.  Forty-nine of the 75 participants had BDI-II 
scores in the range suggestive of minimal depression.  Ten of the participants had BDI-II 
scores suggesting mild depression, 9 had scores suggesting moderate depression, and 7 
had scores suggesting severe depression.     
A third possible problem with the principal investigator’s thesis study was the use 
of an untried set of cue words in the CAMT, i.e., the thesis study did not use a set of cue 
words from one of the previous studies in which a correlation between depression and 
AMT scores was found.  To accommodate the possibility that this correlation is specific 
to particular cue words, the siCAMT and miCAMT in the present study used the same 
cue words as were used in two previously reported studies in which the predicted 
correlation was detected (Burnside et al., 2004; Dalgleish et al., 2007). 
Finally, the sample size in the present research project was based on an a priori 
power analysis.  The effect sizes of -0.43 and -0.41 reported by Dalgleish et al. (2007) 
were taken as approximations of the effect that this study was designed to detect.  Given 
the sample size of 75 participants in the present study, this study had a power of 0.98 to 
detect an expected effect size of 0.40 (Cohen, 1969, at 84, table 3.3.2). 
These four modifications to the study design of the principal investigator’s thesis 
project should have enhanced the ability of the present study to detect a correlation 
between depression and siCAMT scores.  Given this study’s power of 0.98, it is unlikely 
that the present null result simply reflects a type 2 error.  And given the substantial body 
of published studies that detected a correlation between depression and AMT scores, it 





however, aspects of the present study’s design that may have precluded the detection of 
the predicted effect. 
 
Aspects of this study that may have precluded detection 
of the hypothesized correlation 
 
The Cronbach’s alpha for the siCAMT was only 0.69.  It is possible that this low 
internal consistency reflects a relatively high level of random measurement error, and that 
this imprecision prevented the detection of the hypothesized correlations with siCAMT 
scores.  However, the internal consistency of various versions of the AMT are rarely 
reported in the literature, and it is therefore difficult to determine whether the relatively 
low internal consistency of the siCAMT in this study distinguishes it from versions of the 
AMT used in other studies in which the hypothesized association with depressive 
symptomatology was reported.  Only a single other study has been found in which the 
internal consistency of a version of the AMT was reported:  Hauer, Wessel, Geraerts, 
Merkelbach, and Dalgleish (2008) reported that the Cronbach’s alpha for the version of 
the AMT that they utilized was 0.64.  But despite an internal consistency even lower than 
that of the siCAMT in the present study, Hauer et al. reported that the scores on their 
AMT nevertheless correlated with BDI-II scores.  If the internal consistencies of AMT 
scores in other studies are not generally greater than the internal consistency of the 
siCAMT scores in this study, then this cannot account for the present null result. 
 
The computerized AMT minimizes  
experimenter/expectancy effects 
 
In almost all of the studies that have reported significant correlations between 





to-face with each participant.  It is possible that this face-to-face format introduced an 
inadvertent experimenter effect or expectancy effect. 
While testing participants in this research project, as well as in the principal 
investigator’s thesis research project, this author realized that it is typically possible to 
form a rough impression of each participant’s level of depressive symptomatology.  
Indeed, after observing a participant’s bodily postures, vocal tones, and facial 
expressions, it seems impossible to avoid forming such an impression.  Although not 
terribly reliable, such impressions are likely to correlate roughly with measured levels of 
depressive symptomatology. Having formed such an impression, a researcher who then 
administers the AMT face-to-face, and who expects the overgenerality of responses to 
correlate with depression, may inadvertently elicit responses that confirm that expectation 
(Dew, 1993; Hazelrigg, Cooper, & Strathman, 1991).  According to this line of 
supposition, the reported correlations between depression and AMT scores may be 
inflated by this experimenter/expectancy effect when the AMT is administered face-to-
face.   
In the present study, by computerizing the two versions of the AMT and leaving 
the testing room while the tests were being administered, the principal investigator 
minimized such experimenter/expectancy effects.  This may have contributed to the null 
results in the present study.   
Even if, however, the significant results reported in many of the correlational 
studies may have been inflated by such experimenter/expectancy effects, there have been 
other studies in which the AMT was computerized (Rekart et al., 2006) or in which other 





al., 2007), and depression was nevertheless found to correlate with AMT scores.  The 
significant results reported in those cases do not appear to have been inflated with such 
an experimenter/expectancy effect.  Nor can the longitudinal studies in which AMT 
scores were found to predict the course of psychopathology be easily imputed to any such 
experimenter/expectancy effect.   
 
The prior administration of the miCAMT may  
minimize executive capacity demands 
 
As discussed above, the justification for using two different versions of the AMT 
in this study was to attempt to dissociate instruction neglect from autobiographical 
overgenerality:  It was predicted that the miCAMT would measure only autobiographical 
overgenerality, while the siCAMT would confound autobiographical overgenerality and 
instruction neglect.  The justification for always administering the miCAMT prior to the 
siCAMT was to prevent the specificity instructions included in the siCAMT from 
influencing participants’ responses to the miCAMT, i.e., from altering participants’ 
characteristic patterns of spontaneous overgenerality.  It appears possible, however, that 
the research design resulting from these justifications may have inadvertently prevented 
the siCAMT from detecting instruction neglect.  This may be part of the reason that the 
predicted correlation between depression and siCAMT scores was not detected. 
Dalgleish et al. (2007) reported that when the parameters of the AMT are 
manipulated to minimize the demands on executive control, there is no correlation 
between depression and AMT scores. Specifically, Dalgleish et al. varied the time-
duration of the test’s cue words:  Half of the cue words related to time periods longer 





duration cue words would tend to evoke memories that violated the test’s specificity 
instructions.  In order to comply with the specificity instruction, participants would have 
to utilize their executive capacity to inhibit such overgeneral memories, and continue 
searching for a single-day memory.  The other half of the cue words related to events that 
typically occur within a single day (e.g., kiss, accident, evening); it was predicted that 
these short-duration dues words would tend to evoke single-day memories, thereby 
facilitating participants’ compliance with the test’s specificity instruction and minimizing 
demands on executive control.  Dalgleish et al. reported a negative correlation between 
depression and the specificity of memories retrieved in response to long-duration cue 
words (r(16) = -0.50), but no correlation between depression and the overgenerality of 
memories retrieved in response to the short-duration cue words (r(16) =-0.06).  In other 
words, minimizing the demand that the AMT places on executive control tends to 
eliminate the association between depression and AMT scores. 
The design of the present study may have inadvertently minimized the demands 
on executive control involved in responding to the siCAMT.  When the standard-
instruction version of the AMT is administered in isolation, participants are required to 
utilize their executive capacity to retain and comply with three instructions: (1) recall an 
autobiographical memory, (2) that is associated with the cue word, (3) and that is of a 
single-day event.  Each participant’s AMT score represents the extent to which he or she 
succeeded in retaining and complying with the first and third of these instructions.  
However, in the present study the siCAMT was administered following the miCAMT, 
which required participants to retain and comply with the first two instructions: (1) recall 





possible that this prior administration of the miCAMT functioned as a practice session – 
allowing participants to practice the first two instructions until they were essentially 
automatic.  When the siCAMT was then administered to the participants, they were 
required to retain and comply with only a single additional instruction – that the retrieved 
memory be of a specific event.  This inadvertent minimization of demands on executive 
control may have reduced the capacity of the siCAMT to detect instruction neglect, and 
therefore to detect any association between depression and siCAMT scores. 
 
Null result regarding hypothesis 2 
 
Contrary to the second research hypothesis, miCAMT scores did not correlate 
with depression scores.10  The Cronbach’s alpha for the miCAMT was only 0.58.  As 
discussed above in conjunction with the siCAMT, it is possible that the imprecision of 
the miCAMT prevented the detection of the hypothesized correlations.  However, 
because only one published AMT study has been found in which the Cronbach’s alpha 
for the AMT was reported, and in that study (Hauer et al. 2008) the Cronbach’s alpha was 
0.64 but AMT scores were nevertheless found to correlate with BDI-II scores, it is 
difficult to assess the likelihood of this explanation.   
A more probable explanation for this null result may be the inadequate power of 
the present study to detect a relatively small effect size.  As discussed above, Raes et al. 
(2007) administered a sentence-completion, minimal-instruction version of the AMT 
(sc/miAMT) and the BDI-II to a sample of 197 university students, and reported a 
correlation between depression and sc/miAMT scores of r = 0.18 (Williams et al., 2007).  
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 Among the 15 participants recruited from the University Counseling Center, and utilizing uncorrected 
α’s, miCAMT scores were found to correlate with BDI-II.  For the reasons discussed in footnote 9 above, 





Similar results are reported by Debeer et al. (2009), who administered a written-response, 
minimal-instruction version of the AMT (wr/miAMT) and the BDI-II to a sample of 314 
university students and reported a correlation between depression and wr/miAMT scores 
of r = -0.20 (Debeer et al. 2009). 
With a sample of 75 participants, the present study had a power of approximately 
0.48 to detect a correlation of r = 0.18, and a power of approximately 0.54 to detect a 
correlation of r = -0.20 (α = 0.05, single-tailed) (Cohen 1969, at 84, arithmetic 
interpolations from Table 3.3.2).  Thus, even if the results reported by Raes et al. (2007)  
and Debeer et al. (2009) are assumed not to reflect any type 1 error (i.e., even if it is 
assumed that depression and the tendency to give overgeneral responses to a minimal-
instruction version of the AMT correlate at the rate of r = 0.18 or 0.20), there was a 
probability of approximately 0.50 that the present study would fail to detect that effect.  
No inferences can be drawn from a null result in such an under-powered test. 
 
Null result regarding hypothesis 3 
 
 Contrary to the third research hypothesis, siCAMT scores correlated neither with 
depressive rumination nor with executive dysfunction.  The two components of this null 
result will be discussed separately. 
 




 Ramponi et al. (2004) reported that in a sample of nonclinical research 
participants depressive rumination correlated at r = -0.49 with the specificity of responses 





sample of clinically depressed research participants depressive rumination as measured 
by the RSS correlated at r = -0.51with the specificity of AMT responses (Raes et al. 
2005)    And Raes et al. (2006) reported that in a sample of clinically depressed research 
participants depressive rumination as measured by the RRS correlated at r = -0.40 with 
the specificity of AMT responses.   
 Based on these studies, the correlation between depressive rumination and scores 
on the siCAMT was predicted to be in the range of 0.49 to 0.51.  With a sample of 75 
research participants, the present study should have had a power in excess of 0.98 to 
detect a correlation in this range (Cohen 1969, at 84, Table 3.3.2).  It is therefore not 
probable that the null result can be imputed to inadequate power.   
 
Correlation between depressive rumination and depression 
 
 A more plausible explanation for the failure to find a correlation between 
depressive rumination and siCAMT scores relates to the strong correlation between 
depressive rumination and depression.  Depressive rumination was found to be highly 
correlated with depression in this study (r = 0.73; p< 0.01).  This is consistent with the 
report of Ramponi et al. (2004) that depressive rumination (as measured by an instrument 
similar to the RRS) correlated with BDI scores at r = 0.57.  Ramponi et al. reported that 
the overgenerality of AMT responses correlated with both BDI scores and depressive 
rumination, but that when BDI scores were entered in the second step of a hierarchical 
regression analysis, depressive rumination provided no additional contribution to the 
overgenerality of AMT responses in step three (Ramponi et al., 2004).   Given this close 
association between depression and depressive rumination, is it plausible that depressive 





failed to correlate with those scores – the elimination of experimenter/expectancy effects 
and the prior administration of the miCAMT inadvertently minimizing the demands that 
the siCAMT places on executive function.  
 
siCAMT and executive dysfunction 
 
 The siCAMT required participants to comply with an instruction to retrieve and 
report only specific autobiographical memories, and was conceptualized as placing 
demands upon executive function.  For this reason, the overgenerality of responses to the 
siCAMT was hypothesized to correlate positively with measures of impairment of 
executive function. 
 This hypothesis was consistent with other research:  Dalgleish et al. (2007) 
reported partial correlations between the specificity of AMT responses the impairment of 
executive control ranging from pr = -0.39 to pr = 0.60.11  The hypothesized association 
between executive dysfunction and overgenerality of siCAMT responses was also 
consistent with the principal investigator’s thesis research, which found a correlation of r 
=-0.37 between scores on the Visual Search Task and the specificity of AMT responses 
(McCowin, 2007).   
With a sample of 75 participants, this study had a power of approximately 0.94 to 
detect a correlation of 0.37 (α = 0.05, single-tailed; Cohen 1969, at 84, arithmetic 
interpolation from Table 3.3.2).  It is therefore unlikely that the present study’s null result 
reflects type 2 error.  Rather, as discussed above in connection with the failure to find a 
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 The first of these correlations is negative because of the valence of the measure of executive impairment 
– a larger score reflected greater impairment.  This measure correlated negatively with autobiographical 
specificity – greater executive impairment correlated with less specific responses to the AMT.  The second 





correlation between depression and scores on the siCAMT, it is possible that 
administering the miCAMT prior to the siCAMT minimized the demands that the latter 
test placed upon executive functioning, and thereby prevented the detection of any 
correlation between impairment of executive function and the scores on that test.12 
 
Null result regarding hypothesis 4 
 
 Contrary to the fourth research hypothesis, no correlation was detected between 
depressive rumination and miCAMT scores.  Raes et al. (2007) reported that in a sample 
of 197 nonclinically depressed research participants, depressive rumination (as measured 
by the four-item Visual Analogue Rumination Scales) correlated at r = 0.15 with the 
overgenerality of responses to a minimal-instruction version of the AMT.  Similarly, 
Debeer et al. (2009) reported that in a sample of 161 nonclinically depressed research 
participants, depressive rumination as measured by the RRS correlated at r = -0.28 with 
the specificity of responses to a minimal-instruction version of the AMT. 
Based upon these studies, the correlation between depressive rumination and 
scores on the miCAMT was predicted to be in the range of 0.15 to 0.28.  With a sample 
of 75 research participants, the present study should have had a power of 0.38 to detect a 
correlation of 0.15, and a power of 0.79 to detect a correlation of 0.28.  The failure to 
                                                                                                                                  
score reflected more intact executive control, and more intact executive control correlated with more 
specific responses to the AMT. 
12
 It was suggested above that another possible reason for the failure to find a correlation between 
depression and scores on the siCAMT may have been the elimination of experimenter expectancy effects – 
that in the traditional face-to-face mode of administering the standard-instruction test, experimenters 
unwittingly elicit less specific autobiographical memories from participants whom they perceive to be 
depressed.  If not for the results of the principal investigator’s thesis research, that explanation might apply 
equally to the failure to find a correlation between executive dyscontrol and scores on the siCAMT.  As 
noted previously, in that thesis research a significant correlation between one measure of executive 
dyscontrol and scores on test essentially equivalent to the siCAMT was detected.  That result suggests that 
the correlation between executive dyscontrol and the over-generality of responses to the siCAMT is not 





detect the predicted correlation between depressive rumination and scores on the 
miCAMT may simply reflect the relatively small power of this study; no inferences can 
be drawn from a null result in such an under-powered study. 
 
Limitations of the present study and directions for future research 
 
As discussed in the preceding section, the null results in the present study may 
have resulted from three aspects of this study: (1) inadequate power, (2) removal of the 
experimenter or expectancy effect, and (3) the siCAMT’s demand on executive 
functioning having been minimized by the prior administration of the miCAMT.  Each of 




As discussed above, an immediately plausible explanation for the failure to detect 
correlation between scores on the miCAMT and either depression or depressive 
rumination is that the sample of 75 research participants in the current study did not 
provide sufficient power to detect the relatively modest correlations that were expected 
based on previously published studies.  Although it is conceptually simple to remedy the 
inadequate power of the present study design – simply increase the sample size – that 
remedy may not be logistically practical.  
 With respect to the predicted correlation between depression and scores on the 
miCAMT, it would be challenging to design a study with sufficient power that a null 
result would be interpretable.  Raes et al. (2007) reported a correlation of r = 0.18 
between depression and scores on their minimal-instruction version of the AMT; Debeer 





minimal-instruction AMT.  A sample size of 250 research participants would be required 
for a power of 0.94 to detect the larger of these two effect sizes, and a sample size of 450 
research participants would be required for a power of approximately 0.95 to detect the 
smaller of these two effect sizes (Cohen, 1969, at 84, Table 3.3.2).  Given the amount of 
effort involved in collecting and scoring AMT responses, such sample sizes challenge the 
limits of practicality. 
 With respect to the predicted correlation between depressive rumination and 
scores on the miCAMT, an adequately powered study would likely be impractical.  Raes 
et al. (2007) reported a correlation of r = 0.15 between depressive rumination and scores 
on their minimal-instruction AMT; Debeer et al (2009) reported a correlation of r = -0.28 
between depressive rumination and scores on their minimal-instruction AMT.  A sample 
size of 180 research participants would be required for power of approximately 0.96 to 
detect the larger of these effect sizes, and a sample size of 900 would be required for 
power of approximately 0.96 to detect the smaller effect size (Cohen, 1969, at 84, Table 
3.3.2).  It does not presently seem possible to justify the amount of time and expense that 




As discussed above, the failure to detect a correlation between the scores on the 
siCAMT and either depression or depressive rumination may have been an unintended  
consequence of eliminating experimenter/expectancy effects.  Although a limited number  
                                            
13Raes et al. (2007) detected a correlation of r = 0.15 in a sample size of 197.  A retrospective power 
analysis suggests that they had power of approximately 0.65 to detect this effect.  The authors appear to 





of studies have computerized the AMT or administered it to groups of participants, the 
majority of reported studies administer the test in a one-on-one, face-to-face format.  It is 
possible that the experimenters in these studies unwittingly confirm their a priori 
expectations by eliciting overgeneral autobiographical memories from participants who 
appear to be depressed and specific autobiographical memories from participants who 
appear to be euthymic.  The possibility that the widely reported autobiographical 
overgenerality effect is to some extent a result of such experimenter/expectancy effects 
remains to be tested. 
One way to test for the presence of such an experimenter/expectancy effect would 
be to select a reported study that has found a correlation between depression and AMT 
scores, and then to replicate that study as closely as possible, altering only one parameter 
– the face-to-face presentation, administering the AMT instead by computer.  If such a 
study were adequately powered, a failure to find the predicted correlation between 
depression and AMT scores would support an inference that the face-to-face 
administration is producing the autobiographical overgenerality effect.  However, this 
proposed study design might be vulnerable to a criticism that some other parameter had 
been unwittingly altered, and that it was this alteration and not the elimination of face-to-
face administration that would account for the null result. 
An alternative test for the presence of an experimenter/expectancy effect would 
be to create a single, between-subjects study utilizing two versions of the AMT that were 
identical in all respects except the mode of administration – one version being 
computerized, and the other being face-to-face.  A difficulty with such a study would be 





the present study were to administer a face-to-face version of the AMT, he might expect 
there to be an expectancy effect, and therefore overcompensate so as to alter the nature of 
the expectancy effect.  This proposed study design would have to use test administrators 
who had been indoctrinated regarding the expected association between depression and 
AMT scores, but who had not been informed regarding the experimenter/expectancy 
effect. 
 
Prior administration of miCAMT reducing siCAMT’s 
demands on executive control 
 
As discussed above, the failure to detect a correlation between the scores on the 
siCAMT and depression, impairment of executive functioning, and depressive rumination 
may also have been an unintended consequence of administering the miCAMT prior to 
the siCAMT, thereby reducing the demands on executive control involved in complying 
with the siCAMT’s specificity instruction.  This hypothesis could be tested by repeating 
the present study with one alteration – eliminating the miCAMT.  If the predicted 
correlations then emerged between scores on the siCAMT and depression, impairment of 
executive functioning, and/or depressive rumination, this would support an inference that 




As discussed above, the tendency to retrieve nonspecific memories in response to 
standard versions of the AMT has been found to precede the onset and predict the course 
of depression.  These findings suggest that the AMT might be measuring a process that 
poses a vulnerability to depression.  If such a process could be correctly identified, it 





For example, if is assumed that the tendency to retrieve nonspecific memories in 
response to the AMT is a reflection of autobiographical overgenerality, then it might be 
concluded that this is the process that predisposes people to depression, i.e., that an 
overgeneral bias in one’s autobiographical remembering renders one vulnerable to the 
onset and persistence of depression.  And if so, interventions to increase the specificity of 
memory encoding and/or retrieval might be recommended.  However, if it is assumed 
that instruction neglect is the process that drives the tendency to response to the AMT 
with nonspecific memories, then it might be concluded that impairment of motivation 
and/or executive control create a vulnerability to depression.  And if so, interventions 
designed to enhance motivation and/or executive control might be recommended.   
Until it can be determined what process or processes are actually measured by the 





































If you are ready to proceed, click in the 







This subtest will measure the accuracy and speed of your responses.  You 
will see a series of screens like the one below.  Some screens contain a 
vertical black rectangle; others do not.  Note that the example below 









    







If there is no vertical black rectangle, press the “A”  
key with your left hand.  I the screen does contain a vertical  











Try a few practice items.  Pre-position your left hand over the 
“A” key, and your right hand over the “L” key.  Respond as 
quickly and accurately as possible.  Just before each screen 
appears, you will see a cross in the middle of the screen that will 
last or one and one half seconds. 
 
Remember, press “L” if you see the vertical black rectangle; 



























































































































Now you understand the procedure.  There will be a block of 20 
screens, then a 30-second break, and then another block of 20 
screens. 
 
Remember, press the “L” if you see the vertical black rectangle; 
press the “A” if you do not. 
 
When you are ready, click in the “Proceed” button below, and 
































Rumination Response Scale 
 
People think and do many different things when they feel depressed. Please read each of the items 
below and indicate whether you almost never, sometimes, often, or almost always think or do 
each one when you feel down, sad, or depressed. Please indicate what you generally do, not what 
you think you should do. 
  












1. think about how alone you feel              
2. think “I won’t be able to do my job if I don’t snap out of this”     
3. think about your feelings of fatigue and achiness     
4. think about how hard it is to concentrate     
5. think “What am I doing to deserve this?”     
6. think about how passive and unmotivated you feel.     
7. analyze recent events to try to understand why you are depressed     
8. think about how you don’t seem to feel anything anymore     
9. think “Why can’t I get going?”     
10. think “Why do I always react this way?”     
11. go away by yourself and think about why you feel this 
way     
12. write down what you are thinking about and analyze it     
13. think about a recent situation, wishing it had gone better     
14. think “I won’t be able to concentrate if I keep feeling this 
way.”     
15. think “Why do I have problems other people don’t have?”     
16. think “Why can’t I handle things better?”     
17. think about how sad you feel.     
18. think about all your shortcomings, failings, faults, 
mistakes     
19. think about how you don’t feel up to doing anything     
20. analyze your personality to try to understand why you are depressed     
21. go someplace alone to think about your feelings     




























Rumination on Sadness Scale 
When I am sad, down, or feel blue…. 
  
Not at all A little Sometimes Frequently Very Much 
1. I have difficulty getting myself to stop thinking 
about how sad I am. 
     
2. I repeatedly analyze and keep thinking about the 
reasons for my sadness. 
     
3. 
I search my mind many times to try and figure out 
if there is anything about my personality that may 
have led me to feel this way. 
     
4. I get absorbed in thinking about why I am sad and find it difficult to think about other things. 
     
5. 
I search my mind repeatedly for events or 
experiences in my childhood that may help me 
understand my sad feelings. 
     
6. I keep wondering about how I was able to be happy at other points in my life. 
     
7. 
I lie in bed and keep thinking about my lack of 
motivation and wonder about whether it will ever 
return.  
     
8. 
If people try to talk to me or ask me a question it 
feels as though they are interrupting an ongoing 
silent conversation I am having with myself about 
my sadness. 
     
9. 
I question and keep wondering about the meaning 
of life to find clues that may help me understand 
my sadness. 
     
10. 
I repeatedly think about what sadness really is by 
concentrating on my feelings and trying to 
understand them. 
     
11. 
I get the feeling that if I think long enough about 
my sadness I will find that it has some deeper 
meaning and that I will be able to understand 
myself better because of it. 
     
12. I keep thinking about my problems to try and 
examine where things went wrong. 
     
13. 
I exhaust myself by thinking so much about myself 
and the reasons for my sadness. 
 




























Consent Document for Humanities or 
Social/Behavioral Science Research  
 
Background:  
If you meet the following criteria, you are being invited to take part in a 
research study being conducted as a doctoral dissertation project by Steven 
McCowin, a graduate student in Counseling Psychology: 
• English is your primary language;  
• You have normal vision, hearing and reading ability; 
• You are at least 18, and not older than 50; 
• You have no current substance dependence; and 
• You have no history of psychosis, PTSD, or organic brain difficulty.   
 
 The research study regards the relationship between memories and 
emotion. Before you decide it is important for you to understand why the 
research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the 
following information carefully. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you 
would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you volunteer to 
take part in this study. 
 You should be aware that, in order to complete this study, Mr. McCowin 
cannot inform you of all of its details at the outset and that certain details have 
been left out of the description of the study.  However, Mr. McCowin will explain 
these details to you at the end of your participation.  In addition, you are free to 
choose not to participate if you are uncomfortable with this omission or for any 
other reason, and your refusal will not be held against you in any way. 
 
Study Procedure/Intervention/Methods: 
 If you choose to participate in this research study, you will be asked to 
complete a number of questionnaires and tests that have been grouped into the 
following four sections (all of these questionnaires and tests will be administered 
to you in a single session in Room 308F of Milton Bennion Hall): 
The first section will be administered via a computer.  You will be asked to 
recall memories.  This first section will take you approximately 10 minutes to 
complete. After this first section, you will have a five-minute break. 
The second section will also be administered via a computer.  You will 
again be asked to recall memories.  This section will take approximately 15 
minutes to complete 
The third section will be administered by Mr. McCowin.  You will be asked 
to report on your emotional state.  This section should take approximately 20 
minutes to complete.  After this third section you will have a two-minute break. 
The fourth section is a combination of five measures of your processing 
speed, memory, and the ways in which you typically respond to feeling blue.  
Some of these measures will be administered via a computer; others will be 
administered by Mr. McCowin.  This section should take approximately 45 






It will take you approximately one hour and 40 minutes to complete all of 
the questionnaires and tests.  When you are finished, Mr. McCowin will give you 
a full explanation about the purposes of this study and answer any questions you 
may have about the study. 
 
Risks: 
The risks of this study are minimal. You may feel upset thinking about or 
talking about personal memories, or you may feel that your privacy might be 
compromised if you choose to disclose embarrassing memories. These risks are 
similar to those you experience when discussing personal information with 
others.  You should know that Mr. McCowin will hold the content of all of your 
responses strictly confidential.  You may also feel frustrated by some of the tests 
which are purposefully designed to be difficult.  If you feel upset from this 
experience, you can tell Mr. McCowin and he will tell you about resources 
available to help. 
If you are participating in this study to fulfill the research participation 
requirement for a class in Psychology or Educational Psychology, you should 
know that your performance on the questionnaires and tests is not graded and 
will not affect your grades in any of those courses. 
 
Benefits: 
We cannot promise any direct benefit for taking part in this study. 
However, possible benefits include helping you develop a greater understanding 
of the relationship between your memories and emotions. 
 
Alternative Procedures/Intervention/Methods: 
You do not have to take part in this study if you do not wish to do so.  
If you are participating in this study to fulfill the research participation 
requirement for a class in Psychology or Educational Psychology, one of the 
requirements for those courses is that you participate in research activities for a 
certain number of hours.  You will receive two hours of credit for participating in 
the present study. 
 If you were going to participate in this study to fulfill the research 
participation requirement for a Psychology or Educational Psychology class, but 
decide that you do not want to take part in the study, you may earn research 
participation credit by selecting from other studies, or by completing other 
alternatives (typically reading a few chapters and taking a test on each chapter).  
If you are interested in possible alternatives for fulfilling the research participation 
requirement, information on those alternatives will be provided to you. 
 
Confidentiality: 
 Your identity will remain confidential.  Only Mr. McCowin and members of 
his research team will have access to your responses to the questionnaires and 
tests.  Your name will not be associated with any of your written or oral 





will be assigned to you.  Only Mr. McCowin will have access to a list associating 
your name with your number.  All of your written responses will be stored in a 
locked filing cabinet in Mr. McCowin’s work space.  All of your oral responses will 
be recorded as digital files, and will be stored on Mr. McCowin’s password 
protected computer.  Your data will be kept confidential.  However, there are 
some cases in which a researcher is legally obligated to make a report to law 
enforcement agencies regarding certain issues, such as serious threats of harm 
to yourself or to public health or safety. 
 
 If you are currently a client of the University Counseling Center (UCC) or 
of the University of Utah Neuropsychiatric Institute (UUNI), you will be given a 
copy of this consent document and asked to sign it and provide a telephone 
number at which Mr. McCowin can contact you to schedule a testing time.  The 
UCC or UUNI will forward the completed consent document with your name and 
telephone number to Mr. McCowin.  Only Mr. McCowin, members of his research 
team, and personnel of either the UCC or UUNI will have any access to the 
completed consent document with your name and telephone number.  If in Mr. 
McCowin’s clinical judgment there are issues of sufficient severity that it would be 
warranted to alert your counselor at the UCC or UUNI, Mr. McCowin will do so; 
such issues might include threats of harm to yourself or others, or emotional 
distress that is severe enough to raise a significant risk that you might harm 
yourself or others. 
 
 If you are participating in this study to fulfill the research participation 
requirement for a class in Psychology or Educational Psychology, your decision 
to participate or not in this research will not be kept confidential from your 
instructors. 
 
Person to Contact: 
If you have questions, complaints or concerns about this study, you can 
contact Steven McCowin at 581-7148. If you feel you have been harmed as a 
result of participation, please call Steven McCowin at 581-7148. A message can 
be left for Steven McCowin at this number during business hours. 
 
Institutional Review Board: 
Contact the Institutional Review Board (IRB) if you have questions 
regarding your rights as a research participant. Also, contact the IRB if you have 
questions, complaints or concerns which you do not feel you can discuss with the 
investigator. The University of Utah IRB may be reached by phone at (801) 581-
3655 or by e-mail at irb@hsc.utah.edu. 
 
Voluntary Participation: 
 It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part in this study. If you 
decide to take part you will be asked to sign a consent form. You are still free to 





Refusal to participate or the decision to withdraw from this research will involve 
no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. 
 
Costs and Compensation for Participants: 
You will not incur any costs as a result of participating in this research 
study – just your time.  If you were recruited from the Educational Psychology or 
Psychology subject pool, you will receive course credit as compensation for your 
participation.  If you were recruited from the University Counseling Center or the 
University of Utah Neuropsychiatric Institute, you will be given two movie tickets 
as compensation for your participation.  
 
Consent: 
 By signing this consent form, I confirm I have read the information in this 
consent form and have had the opportunity to ask questions. I will be given a 




___________________________________   




Signature of Participant     Date 
 
__(___)___-__________ 






































During the last 2 weeks, how frequently have 














1.  Not finding much interest or pleasure in doing 
the things you usually enjoy. 
    
2.  Feeling sad, down, hopeless, or depressed.     
3.  Difficulty falling or staying asleep, or just the 
opposite: sleeping too much. 
    
4.  Not having enough energy or feeling tired much 
of the time. 
    
5.  Lacking your normal appetite, or just the 
opposite: eating too much. 
    
6.  Not liking yourself very much or feeling that you 
have let yourself or others down 
    
7.  Difficulty concentrating or staying focused on 
what you’re trying to do or read. 
    
8.  Feeling so restless or wound up that you have 
to keep moving or doing something, or just the 
opposite: speaking or moving so slowly that others 
might notice. 
    
9.  Thinking that you might be better off dead, or 
thinking of somehow hurting yourself. 
    































Protocol Order #1 
 
 
Participant # ___ 
 
Consent Document 
 Executed      __ 
 Confidentiality      __ 
 




  Age ___ 
  Gender ___ 
 
 Criteria: English as 1
st
 language    __ 
  Normal vision, hearing, reading ability  __ 
  18 – 50 years old    __ 
  No current substance dependence  __ 
  No Hx of psychosis, PTSD, organic brain injury __ 
 
AMT        __ 
BDI-II        __ 




Stroop        __ 
RRS        __ 




RSS        __ 






Protocol Order #2 
 
 
Participant # ___ 
 
Consent Document 
 Executed      __ 
 Confidentiality      __ 
 




  Age ___ 
  Gender ___ 
 
 Criteria: English as 1
st
 language    __ 
  Normal vision, hearing, reading ability  __ 
  18 – 50 years old    __ 
  No current substance dependence  __ 
  No Hx of psychosis, PTSD, organic brain injury __ 
 
AMT        __ 
BDI-II        __ 




OSPAN        __ 
RSS        __ 




RRS        __ 



































1. As stated in the Informed Consent document, the purpose of this study 
was to explore the relationship between mood and emotion. 
 
2. The detail left out of the Informed Consent document is that we’re 
interested in the specificity of autobiographical memories – that is, 
whether you tend to remember your past life in general terms (e.g., “those 
years in college”) or in specific terms (e.g., “the day I took that 
autobiographical memory test”). 
 
3. Prior study has shown that people who are depressed tend to remember 
in general rather than specific terms. 
 
4. This study has the following specific goals: 
 
a. To see whether a computerized version of the Autobiographical 
Memory Test that omitted any specificity instruction would yield the 
same results; 
 
b. To try and repeat the previously shown correlation between 
depression and autobiographical over-generality; 
 
c. To see if autobiographical over-generality would correlate with 
measures of executive control; and  
 
d. To see if autobiographical over-generality would correlate with 
measures of a tendency to engage in depressive rumination.    
 
5. Any questions? 
 
a. I haven’t yet analyzed your memory responses, so I can’t tell you 
about your level of autobiographical generality. 
b. I haven’t yet scored your responses to the two measures of 
depressive symptomology, but may I ask how you are feeling? 
c. [referral to UCC if appropriate] 
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